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The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence:
Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder
Orientation in Comparative
Corporate Governance
Martin Gelter*
This article proposes a new, functional explanation of the different roles of non-shareholder groups
(particularly labor) in different corporate governance systems. The argument depends on the analysis of a
factor that has so far received relatively little attention in corporate governance research: the level of
shareholder influence on managerial decision making. Pro-employee laws mitigate holdup problems-
opportunism from which shareholders benefit ex post, but which will deter firn-specific investment in
human capital ex ante. Since holdup takes place within what is considered legitimate managerial business
judgment and all shareholders (both nmajority and minority) are its financial beneficiaries, the degree of
managerial autonomy from shareholders is an important factor. In the United States, proponents of a
stakeholder view of corporate law have argued that the insulation that U.S. boards of directors have from
shareholders mitigates the risk of holdup of nonshareholder constituencies by shareholders, thus encouraging
firm-specific investnient such as investment in human capital. However, the large degree of autonomy of
U.S. boards is unusual. This autonomy is eliminated, for example. by concentrated ownership, which
prevails in Continental Europe. This article therefore suggests that, given their costs, laws aiming at the
protection of stakeholders-such as codetermination and restrictive employment laws-may be normatively
more desirable in the presence of stronger shareholder influence, particularly under concentrated ownership.
The theory is corroborated by the observation that such laws tend to be more strongly developed in corporate
governance systems with stronger shareholder influence. The United Kingdom, which has both stronger
shareholder influence and stronger employment law than the United States, is classified as an intermediate
case.
I. INTRODUCTION
The predominant academic view of corporate law today rests on the prin-
cipal-agent paradigm. Most corporate law scholarship continues to analyze
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the law in terms of agency relationships, including both the classic Berle-
Means-type separation of ownership and control under a dispersed owner-
ship structure, and the agency conflict between controlling and minority
shareholders under concentrated ownership. The interests of stakeholders
other than shareholders are usually left on the sidelines, descriptively and
sometimes even normatively. However, recognizing developments in eco-
nomic theory, corporate law theory is increasingly debating the significance
of firm-specific investment by other constituencies; the most prominently
discussed case is specific investment in human capital by employees. While
specific investment is said to enhance the firm's productivity and competi-
tiveness, it also exposes workers to holdup, which in turn creates disincen-
tives for specific investment in the first place.' Some scholars, such as
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, have suggested that the insulation of direc-
tors from shareholders in U.S. corporate law mitigates potential holdup
problems.2
In the comparative corporate governance literature, the impact of stake-
holder theory has remained fairly limited. The literature typically juxtaposes
two types of corporate governance systems. On the one side, arm's length or
outsider systems-mainly the U.S. and the U.K. systems-are said to be
characterized by dispersed ownership, strong securities markets, and agency
problems between shareholders and managers that are held in check by mar-
ket mechanisms, most of all the market for corporate control. Control-ori-
ented or insider systems-such as those of Continental European
countries-have concentrated ownership, 3 less developed securities markets,
and a managerial agency problem mitigated by the monitoring function of
large shareholders and, sometimes, creditors. Large shareholders' private
benefits of control then pose another agency problem.4 In both systems, the
1. In economic theory, the term holdup problem refers to a situation where one party makes an
investment that is specific to the investment of another party. Since this investment cannot be used to
gain the same benefits in a relationship with a third party, the party having made the investment can be
threatened with opportunistic renegotiation of the contract, resulting in the loss of the rent on the
investment if contractual protection is incomplete. Benjamin Klein, Hold-up problem, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). The paradigmatic
example is the Fisher Body-General Motors case. Following an unexpected surge in the demand for cars,
Fisher was able to charge General Motors a supracompetitive price for its car bodies. Ultimately, the
problem was solved by a merger between the two firms in 1926. See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford
& Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L.
& ECON. 297, 308-10 (1978).
2. See Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999); infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
3. See Randall K. Morck, Introduction to CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 1, 1 (Randall K.
Morck ed., 2000); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Corporate Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645-50 (2006) (both summarizing evidence on owner-
ship concentration).
4. See, e.g., Erik Berglbf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 151, 159-64 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997);
Brian R. Cheffins, Does Lau, Alatter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 459, 465 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ouwership: The Roles oflaw and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, I1l YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001).
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scholarship tends to emphasize the importance of protecting investors
against self-dealing by managers and large shareholders.
It is another staple narrative of comparative corporate governance that
Anglo-Saxon systems either do not take stakeholder interests into account,
or do so to a much smaller degree than do Continental systems.' Some com-
mentators suggest that this description is clich~d, and that actual practice
does not differ significantly. 6 Others have observed a shift toward stake-
holder rhetoric in business practice since the early 2000s. 7 Nevertheless, the
dominant view holds that shareholder primacy is the economically efficient
corporate objective, and that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate law will
ultimately prevail in a Darwinian struggle.8 Protecting the interests of other
constituencies is usually thought to be counterproductive, as long as it can-
not be explained by "enlightened shareholder value," that is, a long-run
view toward shareholder wealth that requires some regard to stakeholder
interests in the short run.9 U.S. corporate law, hardened by regulatory com-
petition and efficient markets, is presumed to deviate from this principle
only in exceptional circumstances. Focusing on agency problems, much of
the literature emphasizes that deviations from the "standard" model must
be inefficient."'
Functional explanations providing economic reasons for different degrees
of stakeholder orientation are conspicuously absent from the debate." True,
some corporate governance scholars have sought explanations for the per-
ceived cross-national variation in the concern for stakeholders.12 Some have
emphasized cultural norms, 13 others diverse religious backgrounds. 4 Mark
5. E.g., Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc.": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 Am. J.
COMp. L. 497, 500-01 (2001); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443-49 (2001); Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory
of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 733 (2004); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on
Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 203, 208-09 (1994).
6. See MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 175-90 (2008).
7. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP.
L. 675, 690-98 (2006).
8. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 443-49.
9. See, e.g., John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajec-
tory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531, 537 (2003).
10. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 441-49.
11. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of
Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508 (1999) (discussing the role of industry- and firm-
specific investment in human capital in Japanese corporate governance).
12. See, e.g., PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 8
(2005); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539, 542 (2000) (both criticizing the neglect of employees in corporate governance models).
13. Licht, supra note 5, at 667-86, 733-39 (suggesting that Anglo-Saxons are more likely to accept
single maximand variables such as shareholder wealth).
14. Dirk A. Zetzsche, An Ethical Theory of Corporate Governance History 23 (Ctr. for Bus. & Corp. Law,
Working Paper No. 0026, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970909 (arguing that Catholic
and Lutheran ethical values were historically more conducive to stakeholder orientation than Calvinist
and Anglican ones).
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Roe has suggested that shareholder primacy could be inefficient in concen-
trated industries, as the consumer surplus will be partly captured by share-
holders and partly lost.15 Pro-stakeholder institutions could, therefore, be
seen as complementary to noncompetitive product markets,' 6 which should
then disappear once barriers to free trade have been removed. However, Roe
has also argued that social democratic policies help to entrench the strong
position of stakeholders in many countries. Since the results of these poli-
cies-such as labor codetermination-impede the monitoring of managers,
they also provide the raison d'tre for the continued existence of concentrated
ownership, which in spite of its problems keeps managers under control,
thus lessening agency cost.1 7 To be sure, the significance of cultural and
political factors is hard to deny, and it would not be credible to claim that
every aspect of any corporate governance system is determined by economic
efficiency. However, it is reasonable to believe that relatively successful eco-
nomic systems, such as those of the United States and of most Western
European states, cannot be too far away from a local optimum with respect
to corporate governance.
I argue that the "specific investment" view of the corporation can provide
such an explanation in combination with another important factor that has
been largely overlooked in the comparative literature. Theories suggesting
that the powerful position of the board of directors mitigates holdup risk for
nonshareholder constituencies are sometimes criticized on the grounds that
insulation exacerbates managerial agency problems and is, therefore, not
necessarily helpful to stakeholders. This argument has some value, but it
conflates two different issues. First, corporate law is largely concerned with
protecting investors against illicit self-dealing by managers and large share-
holders. This shareholder protection is the concern of most comparative corpo-
rate governance theories. By contrast, whether stakeholders such as
employees are subject to holdup risks depends on what decisions are taken
by managers within the scope of their legitimate business judgment-for exam-
ple, whether a production site is closed. Such decisions are not usually sec-
ond-guessed by courts. Since shareholders are the financial beneficiaries of
this type of exploitation of employees' expectations, the questions of
whether they can influence these decisions directly and whether managers
otherwise have an incentive to pursue ex-post shareholder wealth maximiza-
15. Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2066 (2001).
16. Id. at 2080-81.
17. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003) [hereinafter ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS); Roe, supra note 12, at 542; see GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 12 (inter-
preting corporate governance structures as result of coalition-building between owners, managers and
workers); Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 Am. EcoN.
REv. 1005 (2005) (suggesting that majority voting systems favor strong shareholder protection and weak
employment protection, while proportional voting systems tend to result in the opposite arrangement);
see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 11 (discussing the role of industry- and firm-specific investment in
human capital in Japanese corporate governance).
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tion are important. This crucial factor in my analysis is what I will refer to
as shareholder influence. I attempt to explain how capital structure and asset
specificity are connected. Specifically, I argue that, all else being equal, con-
centrated ownership exacerbates holdup problems regarding stakeholders,
since shareholder influence is much greater than in a classical Berle-Means
firm. 18
Shareholder influence may help to explain differences we observe in pro-
stakeholder laws in different countries of the "wealthy west." Continental
European corporate governance systems, which are characterized by strong
shareholder influence due to concentrated ownership, have pro-stakeholder
institutions in their corporate governance systems and much more rigid em-
ployment laws than the United States, which to some degree protects em-
ployees against holdup. Since pro-stakeholder laws come at considerable
cost, their desirability varies depending on the respective degree of share-
holder influence. Thus, I argue that both the U.S. and Continental European
systems are close to their respective local optima given their respective own-
ership structures. I provide a new, functional explanation for differences in
pro-stakeholder laws between different systems and institutional comple-
mentarities in corporate governance. However, my explanation differs from
the "varieties of capitalism" literature, according to which divergent sys-
tems are characterized by different modes of production that drive institu-
tional differences. 19 I propose that differences in the law are influenced by
different ownership structures, which have repercussions on the type of pro-
ductive strategies. My analysis suggests that similar levels of firm-specific
investment may be possible under different institutions. However, each pos-
sible set of institutions comes with a different set of costs.
My view is that differences in shareholder influence are variations in de-
gree rather than absolute differences. For my theory to be plausible, team
production theory does not necessarily have to provide the best possible de-
scriptive account of U.S. corporate law.2 0 The point is that it provides a
much better fit in the United States than in Europe. Most of this article
focuses on the differences between U.S.-style dispersed ownership and Con-
tinental European concentrated ownership, and how these types of owner-
18. Some authors have suggested that large shareholders may expropriate stakeholders with relative
ease, but the issue has not yet been analyzed in detail. See Gerard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrires,
Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value versus Shareholder Value, 5 J. MGMT. & Gov. 107, 116 (2001);
Gregory Jackson, Employee Representation on the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Govern-
ance, Unionism and Political Institutions, 12 INDUSTRIELLE BEZIEHUNGEN 252, 258 (2005); Andrei Shleifer
& Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 758 (1997); see also Michel A.
Habib, Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts, 1 EUR. FIN. REv.
139 (1997) (modeling ownership choices following leveraged buyouts).
19. See generally Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Introduction to VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1 (Peter A.
Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
20. For an interesting critique of Blair and Stout's team production theory, see John C. Coates IV,
Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L.
837 (1999).
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 50
ship affect holdup problems. However, I also emphasize that shareholder
influence varies between the United States and the United Kingdom: U.S.
corporate and securities law is highly unusual in the extent to which it dis-
enfranchises shareholders from both explicit and implicit influence. I argue
that the United Kingdom, which is often lumped together with the United
States in comparative corporate governance, constitutes an intermediate case,
standing between the United States and Continental Europe, both in terms
of shareholder influence and legal protection of employees against holdup. 21
Part II of this Article outlines the "agency" and "specific assets" perspec-
tives of the firm. While the classical agency perspective is the basis of the
view that only shareholders should be taken into account in corporate law,
the specific-assets perspective illustrates that this view may be too narrow.
Part III outlines the core thesis of the Article. I define the concept of "share-
holder influence" in detail and describe the different degrees to which it is
present in the United States and Continental Europe. While various eco-
nomic and legal aspects of U.S. corporate governance ensure that U.S. direc-
tors are comparatively independent in their control of the firm, Continental
European directors typically can be influenced by large shareholder groups
with relative ease. Part IV discusses legal strategies responding to share-
holder influence, focusing on employees, who are the most important stake-
holder group. The most important of these strategies are employee
participation systems, such as German codetermination, and employment
protection law. Part V puts together the pieces of the puzzle by suggesting
that the respective combinations of shareholder influence and stakeholder
protection in the United States and Continental Europe possibly constitute
two different local optima-in other words, strong stakeholder protection
should be seen as a complement to shareholder influence, given that share-
holder influence exacerbates the holdup problem. In Part VI, I incorporate
the United Kingdom into the theory as an intermediate case, both with
respect to shareholder influence and with respect to pro-stakeholder laws.
On the one hand, while the United Kingdom shares the preponderance of
dispersed ownership with the United States, coordination between share-
holders is easier. Furthermore, U.K. takeover law forces directors to take
21. While I focus on employees, the analysis might conceivably be extended to other groups, particu-
larly creditors. Some legal scholars have suggested that creditors may benefit from the strong position of
managers when there is a conflict of interest with shareholders. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of
Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 42-43 (1996) (arguing that managers will resist shareholders' attempts to
externalize risks by crediting highly leveraged legal entities); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to
Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1, 17-30 (1986) (describing how the incentive effects of pro-shareholder
institutions fail in a crisis induced by mass tort claims). The impact of corporate governance structures on
the cost of debt in financial economics is still controversial. See Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W.
Collins & Ryan B. LaFond, The Effects of Corporate Governance on Firms' Credit Ratings, 42 J. AcCT. &
ECON. 203 (2006); see also Michael Bradley, Dong Chen, George Dallas & Elisabeth Snyderwine, The
Relation Between Corporate Governance and Credit Risk, Bond Yields and Firm Valuation (Dec. 2007) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1078463; Roman Inderst & Holger H. Mfiller,
Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 190497.
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shareholder interests into account much more strongly than Delaware law.
On the other hand, U.K. employment law is weaker than Continental Euro-
pean regulations, but stronger than U.S. law. Part VII summarizes and
concludes.
II. Two VIEWS OF THE CORPORATION
Most discussion of policy issues within corporate law today is based on
the economic theory of the firm. Regardless of complexities of this theory,
there are two broad perspectives, which can be labeled the "agency" and the"specific investment" views. Whereas the former emphasizes the relation-
ship between shareholders and managers, the latter brings other groups into
the analysis.
A. The Agency Perspective
Most corporate law scholarship, and almost all comparative corporate
scholarship, is dominated by the agency view. The scholarship of Berle and
Means, who first empirically identified the strong separation of ownership
by shareholders and control by managers in large U.S. firms in 1932,22 can
be counted among its early antecedents. However, agency theory was for-
malized and achieved its breakthrough with Jensen and Meckling's seminal
1976 article. 23 While these authors emphasized the nature of the firm as a
nexus of contracts-that is, a focal point of coordination of productive fac-
tors consisting of explicit and implicit contracts 24-the nature of the firm as
a legal entity is not explained under the terms of the theory. Jensen and
Meckling focused on conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers
and described the phenomenon of agency cost, consisting of monitoring
costs, bonding costs, and residual losses that cannot be eliminated by con-
tractual mechanisms. 25
Most corporate law theory today relies on agency theory, which has a
broad set of applications and can also be used to analyze the relationship
between the firm and other stakeholders. However, corporate theory uses it
chiefly to analyze the relationship between shareholders and managers, sug-
gesting that the purpose of corporate law should be the reduction of agency
cost in that relationship, and on the parallel phenomenon arising when man-
agement is under the influence of large shareholders, in which case there
22. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932). Other authors, most famously Adam Smith, identified the issue even earlier.
23. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
24. E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 12 (1991). The nexus of contracts metaphor is usually attributed to Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production. Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
25. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 308.
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will typically be strong conflicts of interest with the minority. 26 While it is
normatively recognized that corporate law should maximize the aggregate
welfare of all corporate constituencies, 27 the interests of constituencies other
than shareholders remain on the sidelines of the debate, as these are usually
thought to be sufficiently protected by contract.2 The design of the respec-
tive corporate law and corporate governance environment will therefore not
normally affect the incentives of groups such as creditors, employees, suppli-
ers, and others who enter into relationships with it under specified contrac-
tual rights and obligations.
By contrast, shareholders do not have such rights, but are left with
residual cash flows, 29 which is why their relationship to management is said
to be of primary importance. As residual risk bearers, shareholders are said
to have the best incentives to monitor other constituencies, maximize the
total value of the firm, and thus maximize social welfare. Thus, residual risk
bearing should be aligned with residual control and the power to change the
arrangement of the use of production factors.3o If managers have incentives
to maximize shareholder value, it follows logically that all other constituen-
cies, whose rights are fixed contractually, receive the full maximum value as
well. Shareholders should therefore be the beneficiaries of managers' fiduci-
ary duties. Creditors are often considered an exception to the pure share-
holder primacy view, 31 as they become residual risk bearers when the
company approaches bankruptcy. 32
B. The Specific Investments Perspective
Without doubt, the agency perspective is of fundamental importance in
the analysis of corporate law. However, it can be criticized as being focused
too strongly-or, in practice, even exclusively-on the financial structure of
26. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 440-43.
27. Henry Hausmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 1, 18 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). As pointed out by these and other authors, the
ultimate goal is to maximize total social welfare. See generally Louis KAPLOW & STEVFN SHAVEtLL, FAIR-
NESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). Anyone whose utility is affected by corporate conduct can be understood
as a stakeholder of the firm. See Janice Dean, Stakeholding and Company Law, 22 COMPANY LAW. 66,
69-71 (2001); see also Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 23-25 (2001) (defining
stakeholders by reference to the firm's externalities).
28. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHL-, supra note 24, at 11.
29. Id. at 10-11.
30. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 24, at 781-83.
31. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 442.
32. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977); see also
Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Commc'ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221 (Del. Ch. 2002); Geyer v.
Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); W.
Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, [1988] B.C.L.C. 250 (Eng.) (all suggesting corporate duties toward
creditors near insolvency). But see N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92 (Del. 2007) (denying direct fiduciary claims by creditors).
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firms, while leaving out the important aspect of bundling of various re-
sources into a joint endeavor. 33
Coase pointed out the importance of transaction costs to the organization
of economic activity in 1937, 34 and the specific investment perspective has
its roots in the theory of transaction costs and incomplete contracts theory.
Of course, agency costs are the consequence of incomplete contracts with
shareholders, but the theory suggests that contracts with other stakeholders
may be incomplete as well. Oliver Williamson emphasized that there were
important impediments to complete contingent contracting, such as infor-
mation asymmetry, opportunism, and bounded rationality. 35 These factors
essentially eliminate a crucial assumption implicit in the agency-theoretical
perspective of corporate law. Oliver Hart and his coauthors developed the
property rights" or "incomplete contracts" approach, which attempts to
explain the assignment of property rights by reference to specific assets of
various parties within the corporate nexus. This theory emphasizes the im-
portance of who "owns" an asset-that is, who has residual control over it.
In those states of the world not specified by contract, decisions will be made
by the owner, which implies a potential to put pressure on other parties who
made such investments in order to appropriate the other parties' rents.3 6
There is widespread agreement today that workers often make invest-
ments by acquiring skills that are only useful in a particular employment
relationship.3 7 For the productive process of the firm, firm-specific invest-
ments may be beneficial, as workers with specialized human capital may be
able to do their jobs more quickly, make fewer mistakes, and create higher-
quality products. Overall, specific investment may make the firm more com-
petitive and therefore better able to succeed in the market. Those invest-
ments may originally be costly for workers to acquire, but it allows them to
gain quasi-rents in the course of the relationship with the firm. For example,
employees may agree to accept a wage below their outside earning capacity
during the training period, but expect to receive wages above their marginal
33. E.g., Bernd Frick, Gerhard Speckbacher & Paul Wentges, Arbeinehmermitbestimmung und moderne
Theorie der Unternehmung, 69 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFT 745, 748, 750 (1999). But see RICH-
ARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 949 (8th
ed. 2006).
34. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
35. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 43-55 (1985); cf OLIVER
HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995).
36. HART, supra note 35, at 29-33.
37. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 949; HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTER-
PRISE 26 (1996); James M. Malcolmson, Individual Employment Contracts, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2291, 2330-33 (Orley Aschenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing the labor econom-
ics literature on contractual protection of specific investment); Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does
Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN.
ECON. 673, 679 (2006); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at
Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 13 (1993). However, not only employees, but also employers, may make
specific investment in the employment relationship. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text re-
garding Rajan & Zingales' theory of the firm, which responds to this complication.
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product once they have acquired experience and have achieved a senior status
within the firm."' While wages are normally fixed claims, other rewards are
not, such as certain types of retirement benefits, expectations regarding job
security and advancement within the corporate hierarchy, and the safety of
working conditions. 39
At times, it may be hard to see why skills learned by employees may be
less useful for them in other jobs. However, firm-specific human capital can
be understood broadly. As labor economist Edward Lazear suggests, some-
times it is not individual skills that are specifically useful within one em-
ployment relationship only, but idiosyncratic combinations of skills. 40 For
example, a combination of knowledge in tax law, economics, and JAVA
programming, required in a firm producing tax optimization software,4 1
will normally not be useful in a single new employment relationship, al-
though one or two of these skills will probably be useful. 42 In the case of a
job change, the employee will lose part of his investment and possibly will
need to reinvest. 43 Employees may also need to learn to work within a differ-
ent corporate culture or organizational structure. 44 A related factor is the
cost incurred by employees to relocate to an area near a potential new place
of employment and to make arrangements to live there, including the reor-
ganization of their social lives.45 These costs cannot be fully recovered. 46 The
employee may not necessarily be "locked in" with the particular employer,
but rather with his employment options in the region where he lives. The
effect is the same if the line of work in which the employee is trained is only
demanded by one employer in the region. Even if other employment oppor-
38. E.g., Thomas Eger, Opportunistic Termination of Employment Contracts and Legal Protection Against
Dismissal in Germany and the USA, 23 IN'r'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 383-84 (2004); Schwab, supra note
37, at 13.
39. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 305-07 (1998).
40. Edward P. Lazear, Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach (Inst. for the Study of
Labor, Discussion Paper No. 813, 2003), available at http://www.iza.org/publications/dps.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. But see HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 71 (suggesting middle- and upper-level managers are
more likely to specifically invest).
43. However, flexibility to retrain may decrease over the years. HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 26.
Obviously, many investments in skills will be industry-specific, which raises two concerns. First, indus-
try-specific skills make it harder for the employer to hold up the employee because the latter can find
alternative employment without losing rents. However, if the employee is not geographically mobile,
industry-specific investment may effectively become firm-specific. Second, as far as costs of skills acquisi-
tion are borne by employers, industry-specific skills allow employees to hold up employers by taking
them elsewhere. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 11, at 509-16 (suggesting that Japanese firms are able to
invest in employee training because their employees have no outside career options).
44. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1, 74 (1986).
45. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY
AND ROUTE 128, at 35 (1994) (quoting an engineer contrasting the difficulty of getting another job in
the same industry in Texas on one hand and the ease in Silicon Valley on the other).
46. HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 26; see EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLI RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS
AND EcoNOMic THEORY 232 (2000). In Europe, language barriers and cultural differences may add to
the costs of relocations.
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tunities are available, he will not be able to make the same wage in a line of
work for which he has no special qualification. Other corporate stakeholders
may suffer a similarly precarious position, such as suppliers who tailor their
production to the needs of a particular purchaser or who set up their produc-
tion site near the purchaser's site.4 7 Stakeholders will make such investments
only if they can expect to gain a rent or quasi-rent, such as payment above
marginal cost, at a later time.
While the predominant view in the economic analysis of corporate law
still assumes that contracts with members of nonshareholder constituencies
are complete contingent ones, real-life contracts are normally not, a fact that
exhibits the highly theoretical characteristic of determining payoffs for all
parties for each possible state of the world.48 For many states of the world,
the necessary transaction cost would exceed the potential welfare gains from
incorporating such a provision into the contract, because each state's
probability is very small. Humans are boundedly rational: the parties are
unable to foresee certain possible contingencies because of cognitive limita-
tions or because the costs of considering them exceed the benefits ex ante.49
Other terms are not included in contracts because they cannot be observed
by the parties ex post or verified by courts. It is, for example, hard to objec-
tively anticipate and measure "the demand for cars, or the degree of innova-
tion, or the extent of government regulation, or the actions of
competitors. "50
Because of the incompleteness of contractual protection, stakeholders can
be subject to holdup by the group in control. If, for example, employees are
locked into the employment relationship, the employer may engage in op-
portunistic wage negotiations by threatening dismissal unless employees
agree to a reduction of wages to marginal revenue products,5" terminate pen-
sion plans,5 2 or default on implicit expectations regarding the employment
relationship, such as career advancement prospects. Shareholders would be
the ex post beneficiaries, as they capture the firm's increased profits available
47. Lynn Stout mentions two interesting examples. First, in the case of PeopleSoft's takeover by
Oracle, companies relying on PeopleSoft's products apparently would have suffered from its integration
into Oracle. Second, the move of a factory from the United States to Mexico may hurt those who pur-
chased real property in the town where the factory is located. Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower:
How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 Bus. LAW. 1435, 1448 (2005).
48. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1999). Complete contingent contracts would have to include
payoffs for all parties involved depending on numerous exogenous factors, such as market demand, ac-
tions of competitors, legal regulation and many others. Id.
49. This concept is attributed to Herbert Simon. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice, 69 Q.J. EcoN. 99 (1955); see also WILLIAMSON, sapra note 35, at 45-46; HART, supra note 35, at
80-82; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
50. HART, supra note 35, at 24.
51. Eger, supra note 38, at 384-85.
52. Coffee, supra note 44, at 70 n.194.
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for distribution." Ex ante, they may suffer if they cannot commit not to
hold up stakeholders.
In many cases, human capital investments will be beneficial for the pro-
motion of the total welfare of both shareholders and employees.5 4 They may
shift a company's production function, allowing for larger output for the
same amount of inputs. In the terminology of the theory of incomplete con-
tracts, those investments will frequently not be verifiable by a third party
and will sometimes perhaps not even be observable ex post by the parties
involved. Human capital cannot be made a part of an enforceable contract, as
a third party like a court will not be able to tell whether an employee has
made the specified amount of relationship-specific investments.55
However, if investments can at least be observed by the firm's manage-
ment or inferred with at least some degree of certainty from output, man-
agement will be able to reward employees for having invested. The prospect
of a reward may constitute part of an implicit contract with the person or
group in charge, which is necessary to induce employees to make such in-
vestments ex ante. 56 For example, workers may be paid below their marginal
product early in their careers for incentive reasons, having the legitimate
expectation of being rewarded with higher wages later. A supplier may ex-
pect to do business with the firm again if his performance was good and he
built a plant tailored to the need of producing for the firm.5 7 Ex post, it may
pay for shareholders to renege on these implicit deals. However, members of
non-constituency groups can be expected to make firm-specific investments
only if their investments can be protected, either by a complete contract or
an implicit arrangement.
If such long-term implicit contractual arrangements are not possible, con-
stituencies such as employees will fail to make firm-specific investments
where they can avoid it, unless they enjoy some protection. This may work
to the detriment of all, including shareholders, as the "total pie" of the
company will be smaller. In that situation, holdup risk is not simply an
external effect of the agency relationship between shareholders and managers
borne by employees. The result may be that ultimately all constituencies are
worse off.
53. Another reason for holdup could be off-work related capital, such as residence near the site of
employment or family and social relations. See Tirole, supra note 27, at 23.
54. E.g., Andreas Engert, Eine juristische Theorie des Unternehmens, in FESTsCHRIFT FOR ANDREAS HEL-
DRICH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 87-89 (Stephan Lorenz et al. eds., 2005); Charreaux & Desbri~res, supra
note 18, at 116-19 (both arguing in favor of maximization of rents received by all stakeholders). This
conforms to the general objective of normative law and economics to maximize total utility. See KAPLOW
& SHAVELL, supra note 27, at 15-38; ANDREU MA-COLLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R.
GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 825-31 (1995). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 12-17 (5th ed. 1998).
55. Cf HART, supra note 35, at 37-38 n.15 (distinguishing the terms "verifiable" and "observable").
56. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37-38 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
57. Id.
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Shareholders may not always benefit from the elimination of holdup pos-
sibilities. In some cases the interests of shareholders and stakeholders will
coincide. That is, catering to the interests of nonshareholder constituencies
will also increase long-term shareholder value because long-term relations
are essential for a firm's success. In other cases, the gain in welfare to non-
shareholder constituencies may exceed losses to shareholders,58 or the losses
incurred by nonshareholder constituencies in a transaction may be smaller
than the gains to shareholders.5 9 However, from a welfare perspective, fur-
thering stakeholders' interests will be desirable. This does not mean that
shareholders should be entirely stripped of their power over corporations.
Their contribution to the firm may still be of crucial importance to the
corporate nexus, as the aggregate of a firm's shareholders cannot withdraw
its contribution to the corporation without liquidating it.60 Individual sell-
ing shareholders will typically not be able to so without incurring losses,
which may explain why some residual control rests with shareholders in
every Western corporate governance system. However, there are limits to its
descriptive and normative explanatory power. Hart and Moore's "property
rights" solution suggested that an agent should be
more likely to own an asset if his action is sensitive to whether he
has access to that asset and is important in the generation of sur-
plus, or if he is a crucial trading partner for others whose actions
are sensitive to whether they have access to the asset and are im-
portant in the generation of surplus. 6'
Rajan and Zingales developed a theory of the firm based on the property
rights approach, but replaced ownership with the concepts of power and
access to resources. 62 They suggest that there are two risks of underinvest-
ment associated with firm-specific assets. First, any party not in control of
the "nexus of specific assets" has an incentive to underinvest in firm-specific
assets to avoid being subject to holdup by the controlling party as under the
Hart approach. Second, firm-specific investments may make it less lucrative
to sell the property right to a third party and more difficult to hold up
others, since the owner will also expect a quasi-rent from the asset.63 As the
party in control should not have an incentive against specializing the asset,
58. See, e.g., Colin Mayer, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evi-
dence, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 144, 146 (1998) (recognizing that the objective of
the firm expands past increasing market value when taking into account the interests of non-shareholder
parties).
59. An example is the possible liquidation and subsequent sale of Rover by BMW to Phoenix rather
than to Alchemy. See Armour et al., supra note 9, at 543-45.
60. Cf WILLIaMSON, supra note 35, at 304-05.
61. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. EcON. 1119, 1149
(1990).
62. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998).
63. Essentially, Rajan & Zingales relax the assumption that the value of an asset for other uses in-
creases at least somewhat with specific investment, which need not necessarily be true. Id. at 406-11.
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it may be more efficient to assign ownership rights to a party that does not
specifically invest at all if specific investments by others are important.6
In a series of articles, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have developed a"team production" approach to corporate law in which they expand on these
models and suggest that the U.S. solution to this problem is to give control
over the firm to the board of directors. Building on incomplete contracts
theory and, more specifically, the Rajan and Zingales model, they suggest
that the fiction of a corporation's legal personality independent from its
members may be a solution to the contracting problems of specific invest-
ment. In this view, corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, yield
control over their specific investments to the board of directors, making it
impossible for them to control how they are used, while exit from the firm is
made difficult by the fact that losses would result.65 Crucially, control over
the firm's assets is not actually given to shareholders, but to the fictional
legal entity of the firm itself.66 Team members submit to hierarchy and
ownership on their own, as it works for their own benefit. 67 Blair and Stout
assert that shareholders are not the only residual risk bearers in a corpora-
tion. 68 Of course, shareholders are the residual risk bearers in the traditional
sense as the group whose financial claims are satisfied with what remains
when everyone else has gotten his due. But on the other hand, other corpo-
rate constituencies frequently make firm-specific investments-for example,
employees specialize their human capital. As a "mediating hierarchy" stand-
ing between all constituencies, including shareholders, directors have the
task of balancing countervailing interests and, if necessary, rearranging pro-
duction factors. Thus, Blair and Stout interpret the board's duty to serve the
interest of the corporation not as shareholder interest, but as the aggregate
welfare function. 69
This view is supported by the large degree of autonomy U.S. corporate
law typically assigns to the board. The picture of directors acting as share-
holders' agents seems incomplete when considering shareholders' inability to
command directors. Fiduciary duties to shareholders are not enough to en-
sure that directors will pursue shareholder primacy, and directors have broad
discretion to adopt takeover defenses, which allows them to promote other
64. Id. at 422-23.
65. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment and Corporate Law, 7 EUR. Bus. ORG. L.
REV. 473, 492 (2006).
66. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 274 n.57.
67. Id. at 274.
68. See also Charreaux & Desbri~res, supra note 18, at 124 (stakeholders assume a part of the residual
risk).
69. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 288-89. Team production theory has been extended to Chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganization. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization,
57 VAND. L. REv. 741 (2004). For Canadian corporate law, see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production
Theory of Canadian Corporate Law, 44 ALBERTA L. REV. 299 (2006).
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constituencies' interests over short-term shareholder value maximization. 70
Shareholders' voting rights may also be overrated and are considered by
some to be largely a fig leaf.7I The fact that such rights exist reflects the
necessity of someone actually voting for directors, and shareholders are likely
to exhibit more homogeneous objectives than other groups, which makes
the voting process less costly.7 2 It has also been suggested that, while the
residual risk bearers argument for shareholder primacy is inconclusive, en-
forceable fiduciary duties are normally restricted to shareholders because
their interests are not well-protected by other mechanisms relative to those
of other constituencies, who usually have more effective means than judicial
lawmaking at their disposal. 73
While proponents of the shareholder primacy view often denounce the
absence of shareholder influence in the United States as inefficient, the team
production approach attempts to provide an efficiency explanation for the
attenuation of shareholder influence. 74 However, its adherents do acknowl-
edge that board autonomy may be a second-best solution, as it worsens the
classic agency problem. 75 I try not to make a strong statement whether team
production provides the best descriptive fit to U.S. corporate governance.
There are a number of objections to the team production approach, such as
its ineffectiveness in some publicly traded firms76 and the persistence of a
market for corporate control. 77 The point of the comparative theory ad-
vanced in this article is not how it compares to agency theory as a descrip-
tive account of U.S. corporate governance, but rather that it is a much better
description of corporate governance in the United States than in other
countries. 78
70. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 290-315; see also D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm,
23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (arguing that the shareholder primacy norm of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) is overrated and that the actual issue was a minority-majority conflict); cf Jill E.
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 651 (2006) (pointing out that Delaware
takeover case law permits directors to consider the interests of stakeholders unless the board has put the
company up for sale).
71. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007).
72. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 309-13; see also HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 44, 62-64, 89-119
(suggesting collective decision-making costs as a reason for ownership by providers for finance, given
their greater homogeneity of interests compared to other groups).
73. Fisch, supra note 70, at 667-68.
74. Other explanations have emerged in the literature. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 556-58 (2003) (arguing that
"director primacy" is necessary to avoid collective decision-making problems that would result from
direct shareholder involvement); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (suggesting that the board's autonomy permits directors to react to the
pressure of moral and social sanctions as a sole entrepreneur would, allowing social norms to fill the gaps
left by public enforcement).
75. Blair & Stout, supra note 65, at 493.
76. Coates, supra note 20, at 840-41.
77. Id. at 849-59.
78. This may well be the reason why the "team production" theory has so far received little attention
in Europe.
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III. THE STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE IN DISPERSED AND
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP SYSTEMS
Part III proposes that shareholder influence may be the cause of holdup of
nonshareholder constituencies, and that stronger shareholder influence, par-
ticularly in the case of concentrated ownership, implies a greater risk of
expropriation for stakeholders, such as employees. Part III.A defines share-
holder influence. Part III.B describes the situation in the United States and
argues that shareholder influence is comparatively small. Part III.C provides
the contrasting picture of Continental European concentrated ownership sys-
tems. In both the United States and Continental Europe, aspects of corpo-
rate law reinforce their respective stances toward shareholder influence.
A. Shareholder Influence Defined
By shareholder influence, I refer to the explicit or implicit influence of
shareholders on managerial decision making within managers' legitimate
business judgment. Shareholder influence must not be confused with share-
holder protection against illicit activity by managers or controlling sharehold-
ers, which is the subject of much of the literature on agency problems in
large corporations. 79 The distinction roughly corresponds to the traditional
dichotomy between the duties of loyalty and care to which directors are
subject under U.S. corporate law.80 The duty of loyalty is, at its core, con-
cerned with self-dealing transactions, and requires a manager to act fairly to
the company when she is self-interested.8 1 By extension, it also applies to
controlling shareholders.8 2 The duty of loyalty is usually thought to be vig-
orously enforced by the courts in dealing with the misappropriation of cor-
porate assets by directors, managers, or large shareholders to their own
personal benefit. 83
79. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law
and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J, FIN. ECON. 430 (2008); Priya P. Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder
Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007). Note that the definition of shareholder
influence differs from the one espoused by Zetzsche, who focuses mostly on legal mechanisms of share-
holder protection. See Dirk Zetzsche, Explicit and Implicit Systems of Corporate Control-A Convergence Theory
of Shareholder Rights 23 (Ctr. for Bus. & Corp. L., Working Paper No. 0001, 2004), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract --600722.
80. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 241 (2d ed. 2007).
81. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 166-71 (1986);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in American Corporate Law, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REv
1, 14 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Good Faith); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in
Corporate Law, 13 J. CORP. L. 997, 997 (1988). For a comparative overview, see Luca Enriques, The Law
of Company Directors' Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, 2 INT'L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 297 (2000); Gerard
Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 101, 114-18
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
82. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 80, at 306-07.
83. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate
Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 427 (2001).
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One might think that the ideal to which directors and managers are held
should be shareholder value maximization.8 4 However, it is doubtful
whether the "shareholder primacy norm" is good law at all. For example,
Gordon Smith argues that the famous shareholder primacy argument of
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. ,85 and even older case law, did not arise in the con-
text of actual shareholder-stakeholder conflicts but was used to resolve con-
flicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority investors.8 6
More than half of U.S. states have introduced constituency statutes, which
allow or require directors to take employee interests into account, particu-
larly in response to hostile takeovers.87 In other states, most of all Delaware,
takeover case law has required directors to take into account "the impact on'constituencies' other than shareholders"-creditors, customers, employees,
and perhaps even the community generally.8 8 While there is a good case to
say that the shareholder primacy norm is not good law in the United States
at all,8 9 even scholars who do not follow this view are in agreement that the
shareholder primacy norm is enforced only very rarely. 90
The duty of care is a much looser constraint on managerial conduct. The
crucial delineation of the duty of care is the business judgment rule, accord-
ing to which directors are given plenty of leeway in daily decision making as
long as they gather the relevant information before deciding, act in good
faith, and stay clear of self-interest. 91 The prominent provision of Delaware
General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), section 102(b)(7), even allows firms to
entirely preclude liability for violations of the duty of care,' 2 and most Dela-
ware corporations have made use of this option. 93 While doctrinal structures
84. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
85. Id.
86. Smith, supra note 70, at 315-20.
87. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and High Fears, 1999 ANN.
SuRv. Am. L. 85, 125-28 (1999) (listing a total of thirty-two statutes; among those, thirty constituency
statutes and twenty statutes explicitly allowing directors to consider the corporation's continued inde-
pendence as optimally serving the corporation's and shareholders' interests). Nebraska's statute was re-
pealed in 1995. Id. at 95.
88. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). The Unocal "reasonable-
ness" standard of review continues to characterize the Delaware case law on directors' actions in facing
hostile takeovers. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; e.g., Black v. Hollinger Int'l, 872 A.2d
559, 565 (Del. 2005); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 918, 928, 931, 932 (Del.
2003).
89. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 163 (2008)
(arguing that Dodge v. Ford is not good law and hardly ever used as a precedent).
90. See ALLEN ET AL.., supra note 80, at 295. Courts tend to defer to managers regarding whether a
managerial decision promotes shareholder primacy or not. E.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d. 776,
778 (Ill. App. Cc. 1968).
91. ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (1994).
92. DEL. COrSE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
93. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155,
1160-61 (1990) (reporting that ninety percent in a random sampling of 180 publicly traded firms
introduced such a provision). Regarding the more recently developed "duty of good faith", which is not
covered by § 102(b)(7), see In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); Eisenberg, Good Faith, supra note 81; Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy
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vary and the business judgment rule is not universal, 94 it appears to be rec-
ognized across jurisdictions that directors should not be constrained too nar-
rowly by a standard of care.95 Shareholder suits remain rare outside of the
United States.96 Mark Roe summarizes this state of affairs by stating that
"[clorporate law does not even try to directly control the cost of managerial
mismanagement or non-conflicted disloyalty, from managers not working
hard enough for shareholders. "97 It does "little, or nothing, to directly re-
duce shirking, mistakes and bad business decisions that squander share-
holder value."'98 While Roe talks about U.S. law in the context of the second
quotation, the situation is similar elsewhere.
In short, as long as managers do not steal, they have wide discretion on
how to run a business within what is generally considered their legitimate
business judgment. 99 Day-to-day business decisions and some fundamental
decisions of the firm are made by top management, although more signifi-
cant decisions may sometimes require approval by shareholders.100 Manage-
and the End of Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 379 n.197 (2007); Hillary Sale,
Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004).
94. For example, there is no business judgment rule under U.K. law. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER
AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 16-15 (8th ed. 2008); Brian R. Cheffins &
Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2006); see also
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 170-81 (U.K.) (codifying directors' duties without introducing such a
rule).
95. Regarding the United Kingdom, see DAVIES, supra note 94, 16-15; Cheffins & Black, supra
note 94. Regarding France, see 1 YVES GUYON, DROIT DES AFFAIRES 459 (12rh ed. 2003). Regarding
Italy, see Giuseppe Campana, La responsabilit2 civile degli amministratori delle societd di capitali, 16 NuovA
GIURISPRUDENZA CIVILE COMMENTATA II 215, 224-26 (2006); Antonio Rossi, Art. 2392: Responsabilit,
verso la societ, in IL Nuovo DIRiTTo DELLE SOCIETA 790, 796-803 (Alberto Maffei Alberti ed., 2005). A
German statute modeled on the U.S. business judgment rule (§ 93(2) AktG) was introduced by the
Gesetz zur Unternehmensinregrit~t und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts [Integrity of Undertak-
ings and Modernizing the Law of Contestation Act] ("UMAG") (Sept. 22, 2005, BGBI. I at 2802) after
broad managerial latitude had been already recognized in the case law. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 21, 2004, II ZR 175/95 (known as the "ARAG/Garmenbeck" decision).
Regarding the decision, see Erich Schanze, Directors' Duties in Germany, 3 COMPANY & FIN. INS. L. REV.
286, 291-92 (1999).
96. Regarding the United Kingdom, see, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Govern-
ance: Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 51, 61-63
(1998); regarding France, Germany, and Italy, see Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter,
Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 491, 507-12 (2007).
97. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 17, at 162.
98. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 243 (2002).
99. See Mark J. Roe, On Sacrificing Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 88, 88, 90-91 (Bruce L. Hay, Robert N. Stavins & Richard K.H.
Vietor eds., 2005) ("The business judgment rule is in fact so large that it effectively allows managers the
discretion to sacrifice profits in the public-and any other-interest, without fear that shareholders
could successfully sue them.")
100. Shareholder approval requirements are more important in Continental Europe than in the
United States. See, e.g., Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 739-41 (2005); PRIYA P. LELE &
MATHIAS M. SIEMS, SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX FOR THE UK, THE US, GERMANY, FRANCE, AND
INDIA (2007), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdflLele-Siems-Shareholder-lndex-Finall .pdf (com-
paring the power of the shareholder meeting in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United
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rial decisions of this kind may have considerable impact on the wealth or
well-being of shareholders and other stakeholders, and may even pitch these
interests against each other (for example, when management considers the
closure of a plant or negotiates a collective bargain with union representa-
tives). Neither the law nor the courts will dictate a particular decision to
managers."°' How they will use their discretion will depend on their per-
sonal interests and incentives.
With this distinction in mind, it is obvious that shareholder protection
against self-dealing either by managers or by controlling shareholders may
be well-developed, while at the same time, shareholder influence may remain
small. Legal remedies against illicit private benefits may be an effective de-
terrent without any shareholder influence on regular decision making and
without any incentives aligning managerial conduct with shareholder pri-
macy. U.S. corporate law is generally thought to provide good shareholder
protection against managerial self-dealing, while the strong role of the board
of directors in corporate governance is evident. °2
Shareholder influence can be created in various ways within what is con-
sidered reasonable business judgment. There are effectively two broad types
of shareholder influence, which can be labeled explicit and implicit shareholder
influence. Explicit shareholder influence is created by direct intervention of
shareholders into management. It is strongest in the presence of a controlling
shareholder, but even a number of cooperating large shareholders may di-
rectly influence important business decisions. This type of influence is most
relevant under concentrated ownership. Implicit influence refers to incen-
tives created by the institutional framework that might force managers to
act as if shareholders were directing business. This may be the result of
strong market mechanisms that implicitly force managers to pursue share-
holder interests.10 Implicit shareholder influence is important in a system
characterized by dispersed ownership. Shareholder influence thus describes
all institutional factors that determine whether managers are forced or in-
centivized to pursue shareholder interests within the discretion assigned to
them by corporate law. 0 4
States, and India); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in THE ANAT-
OMY OF CORPORATE LAW 33, 57-58 n.107 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
101. This may change when a firm approaches bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda,
Creditor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw 71, 88-91 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds.,
2004).
102. See Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 573 (emphasizing that U.S. law provides a strong shareholder
wealth maximization objective but little shareholder influence). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 833 (2005) (arguing that U.S. corporate governance
would benefit from stronger shareholder power).
103. Cf Zetzsche, supra note 79, at 17-21 (characterizing Continental corporate governance systems
as explicit systems with direct shareholder influence while characterizing Anglo-Saxon systems as im-
plicit systems).
104. Explicit influence is most important in control-oriented systems, while implicit influence is
most important in arm's length systems. On the distinction, see Bergl6f, supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
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B. Separation of Ownership and Control as a Possible American Advantage
1. Insulation of Managers from Shareholder Influence
As described above, alternative economic interpretations of U.S. corporate
law and governance, particularly team production theory, 105 emphasize the
large degree of autonomy managers enjoy in the United States. Regarding
the theory that shareholder influence on managerial business judgment exac-
erbates holdup problems, it is evident that this factor is less significant
under the typical U.S. corporate governance structure than elsewhere.
Consider explicit shareholder influence. Dispersed shareholders are subject to
collective action problems caused by rational apathy and the free-rider phe-
nomenon.10 6 Notably, explicit shareholder influence is reinforced by certain
requirements of corporate and securities laws. While the Delaware courts are
generally protective of the voting process as such10 7 and have considered the
possibility of ousting managers as a safety valve for discontent sharehold-
ers,' 0 8 proxy contests remain quite rare. Lucian Bebchuk reports that the
number of contested proxy solicitations per year never exceeded forty for the
period between 1996 and 2004, during which time there were about 300
contested solicitations in total.'0 9 Some of the reasons mentioned are stag-
gered boards and the costs of electoral challenges." 0 While incumbents can
be sure to finance their proxy costs out of the corporate cashbox, challengers
only have a chance to be reimbursed if their assault on the corporate fortress
succeeds. 1
In an environment of dispersed ownership, coordination between share-
holders is a prerequisite to explicit shareholder influence. However, some of the
most severe impediments are established by federal securities law. Under
section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, anyone directly or indirectly
acquiring beneficial ownership of five percent of any class of equity security
must submit a 13(d) filing to the SEC within ten days. 1 2 An important
aspect is SEC Rule 13d-5(1), under which persons acting together "for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity securities" are
deemed a group for purposes of section 13(d), and are thus required to sub-
mit a 13(d) filing if they jointly surpass the five percent threshold. This
105. See discussion supra Part II.B.
106. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 63-72; see also CLARK, supra note 81, at 390-93.
107. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus., Inc., v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
108. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
109. Bebchuk, supra note 71, at 682-83. Not all of these were electoral challenges, and less than half
of them were successful. Id. at 686-87.
110. Id. at 688-91, 694.
111. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (estab-
lishing the "Froessel rule"). For a deeper analysis, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Frame-
work for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1106-26 (1990).
112. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 US.C. § 78(m)(d) (2000); 17 C.F.R. 240 § 13d-
l(a) (2008).
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requirement is generally thought to inhibit, if not entirely prevent, coordi-
nation between shareholders because proponents run the risk of a lawsuit by
the company or other shareholders on the basis that they may have failed to
disclose their plans completely.113 Another impediment to coordination is
the danger of communication between security holders triggering the costly
duty to file a proxy statement under section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act if it is "reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding
or revocation of a proxy."1 14 Most shareholder proposals are therefore made
under Rule 14a-8, which allows a proposal to be included in the company's
proxy statement. However, this option is limited to specific subject matters
and requires submission six months before the shareholder meeting."l 5
Implicit shareholder influence could be created by incentives for managers to
act in the interest of shareholders, most of all during hostile takeovers.
Before the backdrop of the U.S. takeover wave of the 1980s, Coffee, and
shortly thereafter, Shleifer and Summers, suggested that hostile takeovers
create an opportunity for shareholders to renege on implicit contracts with
employees by selling out to a raider who will break up the firm.'1 6 However,
while it would be an overstatement to say that takeovers were a fad that
passed with the 1980s, they have become considerably rarer as a consequence
of the development of Delaware case law during the 1990s. With the nar-
rowing of the Unocal-1 standard in Unitrin"15 and the restriction of Revlon 19
duties under the two Paramount1 20 cases, managers are essentially able to
"just say no"' 21 to a hostile bid. The second element of an anti-takeover
bulwark is the staggered board. Under DGCL section 141(d), if permitted
by the charter or bylaws, a board of directors may be classified into three
groups, each of which faces election every three years, meaning that only one
113. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 461 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 837, 842,
877-82 (1994).
114. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (2000); 17 C.F.R. 240 § 14a-
I(l)(1)(iii) (2008).
115. Black, supra note 113, at 459; see also Coffee, supra note 113, at 884. Regarding impediments
affecting institutional shareholders such as banks and insurers, see MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,
WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (arguing that bank-
ing regulation and other New Deal-era laws prevented banks and insurance firms from taking a greater
role in U.S. corporate governance).
116. Coffee, supra note 44, at 70-71, 73-81; Shleifer & Summers, supra note 56; see also Julian Franks
& Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, Germany and the UK, 5 ECON.
POL'Y 189, 213-14 (1990) ("Changes in ownership undermine the ability of firms to sustain a reputation
for long-term relationships.").
117. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
118. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
119. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986).
120. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1993); Paramount
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
121. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, 'Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted
Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 516 (1997).
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third of the directors are elected each year. 122 By default, in the case of a
classified board, shareholders may remove directors only for cause. 123 Thus, a
takeover bidder or someone launching a proxy contest needs to sustain his
attack over two subsequent elections in order to obtain a majority of the
board. In the case of what Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian have defined
as an "effective staggered board"12 4 where this type of board structure has
been implemented in the company's charter, dismantling it requires ap-
proval by the board itself. 25 The bidder cannot simply take control of the
shareholder meeting and subsequently de-stagger the board. These authors
provide strong empirical evidence that, 26 due to the combination of stag-
gered boards, poison pills, 27 and the cost of committing to an offer price
over two elections, 2 U.S. boards can effectively shield themselves, render-
ing hostile takeovers almost impossible in many cases. 29 Thus, the current
regime of takeover law offers powerful defenses to managers, further attenu-
ating possible implicit shareholder influence through market forces. This
contrasts noticeably with the United Kingdom, where directors are required
to maintain neutrality vis-a-vis a hostile bid and where the number of hos-
tile takeovers is higher. 1 0
To be sure, holdup situations could also be the result of a friendly take-
over of a firm with dispersed ownership. In fact, overall mergers and acquisi-
tions activity has by no means decreased after the end of the takeover
wave.' Kahan and Rock have suggested that performance-based executive
compensation schemes rewarding managers in the case of an acquisition have
developed as "adaptive devices" by shareholders in response to the preva-
lence of strong takeover defenses, thus turning what would otherwise be
hostile takeovers into friendly ones and aligning the interests of managers
with shareholders. 132
122. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000).
123. Id. § 141(k)(i). Most states other than Delaware allow staggered boards. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893-94 (2002).
124. Bebchuk et al., supra note 123, at 894.
125. An amendment of the charter requires approval of both the board of directors and shareholders.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2000).
126. Bebchuk et al., supra note 123, at 925-39.
127. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (accepting the legality of "share-
holder rights plans," otherwise known as poison pills).
128. Bebchuk et al., supra note 123, at 922-23.
129. See also Stout, supra note 47, at 1436 ("the board of directors of a public company enjoys at least
as much legal authority to decide whether or not the company will sell itself as ...in 1979").
130. See infra notes 369-78 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Factset Mergerstat, M&A Activity: U.S. and U.S. Cross-Border Transactions, http://
www.mergerstat.com/newsite/free-reports_mand-a_activity.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2008); see also
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to
Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 879-80 (2002).
132. Kahan & Rock, supra note 131, at 896-99; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on
Anti-Takeover Laws in the E.U.: The German Example, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN
EUROPE 541, 553-54 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004).
2009 / The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence
However, there are also a number of objections to this view. Critics of
current executive compensation practices (writing from a shareholder pri-
macy perspective) have pointed out that it is very difficult to design com-
pensation plans that provide an alignment with shareholder interests
equivalent to that provided by an effective market for corporate control, as
the "reward" provided by a golden parachute could easily be too high or too
low to provide the right incentives. 133 Others have criticized that the theory
depends on the debatable assumption that unconstrained managers will
agree to a compensation scheme making them accountable to sharehold-
ers. 134 Furthermore, a windfall gain from a friendly takeover will not subject
managers to a constant threat of losing their position if they do not maxi-
mize shareholder wealth.135 This is consistent with the empirical evidence in
the United States that does not appear to support the "bargaining power"
hypothesis of staggered boards, as these boards generally appear not to pro-
duce higher premia for shareholders.1 36 It is of course possible that in some
cases a bidder may "bribe" management into letting a takeover go forward
and then reap holdup profits from stakeholders. To the extent that this is a
common phenomenon, U.S. corporate governance may indeed have diverged
from the local optimum described in this Article 37 as a result of the take-
over wave and the subsequent rise of executive compensation. However, for
this Article's objective of comparing the degree of shareholder influence in
different systems, it is important to note takeover activity in general (in-
cluding friendly mergers) is more intense in the United Kingdom. 138 While
friendly takeovers and mergers may happen for a variety of reasons (includ-
ing efficiency), this appears to support the conclusion that the United King-
133. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973,
1013-16 (2002). Generally, U.S. executive compensation practices have in recent years come under criti-
cism for allowing managers to draw rents from the firm instead of aligning their interests with those of
shareholders. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,
17 J. ECoN. PERsP. 71 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005); see also Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be
Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J. MGMT. INQ. 96, 99-100 (2005) (suggesting that managers should receive
fixed compensation); Tirole, supra note 27, at 26.
134. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The
Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEo. L.J. 1727, 1742 (2007).
135. Id.
136. Bebchuk et al., supra note 123, at 935-36; see also Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow
of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621 (2003) (arguing that the empirical evidence does not support the
hypothesis that takeover defenses allow managers to bargain for higher prices for shareholders).
137. See discussion infra Part V.A.
138. Armour & Skeel, supra note 134, at 1738 (providing data indicating that the United Kingdom
does not merely have a larger proportion of hostile takeovers, but also a considerably larger volume of
total mergers and acquisitions activity in relation to GDP). The total GDP of the United States is about
six times as large as that of the United Kingdom, see Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, whereas Armour & Skeel report
54,849 mergers in the United States and 22,014 in the United Kingdom for the period between 1990
and 2005, Armour & Skeel, supra note 134, at 1738.
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dom's corporate governance system is still characterized by a higher degree
of implicit shareholder influence. 139
2. How Stakeholders May Benefit from the Insulation of Managers
Managers and directors are by no means required to pursue the interests
of employees and other stakeholders, and their interests are not necessarily
aligned with these groups. 140 However, proponents of team production the-
ory have argued that directors must serve corporate constituents well if they
want to keep their jobs, 14 1 while social norms-reinforced by corporate
law-dissuade them from engaging in self-dealing and compel fairness and
loyalty toward the firm's constituents. 142 Part of the argument is that man-
agers often behave in a way that would be considered economically rational
in a narrow sense, but that they need to enter into relationships of trustwor-
thiness with stakeholders in order to further the joint goals of the corporate
coalition. 143
The social norms argument is fairly controversial. A social norm of short-
term stockholder value maximization is often blamed for corporate scan-
dals, 144 and it may well be true that there is no uniform answer regarding
what kind of social norm prevails.' 45 However, this could be a recent pathol-
ogy resulting from the incompatibility of increased implicit shareholder in-
fluence and a team production approach. 146 More importantly, there is some
evidence that entrenched management is associated with a low Tobin's Q147
(a measure of shareholder wealth), while takeovers seem to correlate with
reductions in wages of varying degrees. 48 Antitakeover statutes are associ-
139. See discussion infra Part VI.
140. Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 909-11.
141. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 315.
142. Id. at 315-16.
143. Blair & Stout, supra note 83, at 438-41.
144. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TL. L. REv. 1275,
1357 (2002) (citing SEC chairman Arthur Levitt); John S. Reed, Values and Corporate Responsibility: A
Personal Perspective, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 35, 36-37 (Jay W. Lorsch, Leslie
Berkowitz & Andy Zelleke eds., 2005).
145. Roe, supra note 99, at 93-94.
146. Frey & Osterloh, supra note 133, at 99-100.
147. See Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113 (2007). See
generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005)
(providing empirical evidence regarding charter-based staggered boards).
148. See Jagadeesh Gokhale, Erica L. Groshen & David Neumark, Do Hostile Takeovers Reduce Ex-
tramarginal Wage Payments?, 77 REv. ECON. & STAT. 470 (1995) (finding a reduction of extramarginal
payments to senior workers after a hostile takeover); Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effect of
Ownership Changes on the Employment and Wages of Central Office and Other Personnel, 33 J. L. & ECON. 383
(1990); Joshua G. Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums?, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 263
(1990). But see David Neumark & Steven A. Sharpe, Rents and Quasi-Rents in the Wage-Structure: Evidence
from Hostile Takeovers, 35 INDUS. REL. 145 (1995) (finding no higher likelihood of firms with ex-
tramarginal wage payments being subject to hostile takeovers). Similarly, bondholders with little con-
tractual protection tend to lose wealth. See Paul Asquith & Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk, Covenants, and
Bondholder Returns in Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1990); see also Gilles Chemla, Hold-up,
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ated with higher pay. 149 Similarly, takeover defenses seem to be associated
with lower cost of debt, suggesting an advantage for creditors.1 50 Another
recent study finds that managerial entrenchment is connected to enhanced
corporate social performance and worker satisfaction. 51
Behavioral theory suggests that when managers are subject only to loose
constraints they generally do not try to maximize profits, but to "profit-
satisfice" by determining what payoff would be acceptable for providers of
equity. 5 2 Profits made by the firm cannot be verified by outside sharehold-
ers and therefore need not necessarily be disgorged to shareholders to their
full extent.153 Empirical findings suggest that managers tend to prefer a"quiet life," where such things as plant closings are avoided, 5 4 which will
typically be in the interest of employees. More generally, a preference for the
continuation of operations without any fundamental changes should also im-
ply avoiding job cuts and union antagonization. Under certain circum-
stances, such as when facing hostile takeovers, employees and top
management are therefore natural allies. 55
One might object by arguing that the insulation of managers exacerbates
the agency problem with respect to shareholders, which is a more important
concern. No interest group, apart from managers themselves, benefits from
illicit managerial self-dealing. This type of conduct is typically addressed by
the duty of loyalty. Furthermore, there is the potential problem of insuffi-
cient effort by managers and employees. Hence, the creation of an optimal
Stakeholders and Takeover Threats, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 376, 379 (2005) (summarizing the
literature).
149. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and
Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043 (2003) (finding higher wages for workers following an-
titakeover statutes, but suggesting that these did not lead to higher productivity); Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J.
ECON. 535 (1999); see also Henrik Cronqvist, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd & Jonas
Vlachos, Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More? (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper
No. 5731, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=883717 (reporting data for Sweden).
150. Ashbaugh-Skaiffe et al., supra note 21. But see Bradley et al., supra note 21 (finding that this
holds only for investment grade firms).
151. Jordi Surroca & Josep A. Trib6, Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance, 36 J.
Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 748 (2008).
152. JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COR-
PORATIONS 30-31 (7th ed. 2004); Coffee, supra note 44, at 29; Elhauge, supra note 74, at 804. The
theory of "satisficing" can be traced to Simon, supra note 49. See also Julius Margolis, The Analysis of the
Firm: Rationalism, Conventionalism, and Behaviorism, 31 J. Bus. 187, 190 (1958); Christoph Engel, The
Behaviour of Corporate Actors: A Survey of the Empirical Literature (Max Planek Inst. for Research on Collec-
tive Goods, Preprint No. 23, 2008), available at hrtp://ssrn.com/abstract= 1135184.
153. E.g., M. Pagano & P.F. Volpin, Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control, 60 J. FIN. 841, 842
(2005).
154. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 149, at 1066-67.
155. See, e.g., Martin Hellwig, On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 122-25 (Xavier Vives ed.,
2000) (describing the alignment of managerial and stakeholder interests); Pagano & Volpin, supra note
153, at 864 ("Managers and workers are natural allies against a takeover threat."); Roberta Romano, The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 120-22 (1987) (arguing that managers and
workers often form coalitions against hostile takeovers at the political level).
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corporate governance regime should be seen as an exercise of striking the
right balance between the minimization of agency costs and holdup costs.
For this Article, the crucial aspect of the analysis is the comparison of the
U.S. situation to a system with pervasive shareholder influence. Holdup will
take place only if there are beneficiaries whose interests align with those of
managers. In the absence of shareholder influence, and as long as they are
the exclusive beneficiaries, managers will weigh costs and benefits against
each other when deciding whether to put pressure on other stakeholders.
When managers have to share benefits with shareholders, their incentive to
engage in holdup is reduced and is more likely to be outweighed by other
factors. Hence, to rule out the possibility that stakeholders benefit from
insulation of managers, one would either have to show that there are no
significant firm-specific investments by stakeholders or that managers are
the exclusive beneficiaries of holdup (without any ex post benefit to share-
holders), both of which are very strong assumptions.
C. Concentrated Ownership and Holdup Potential in Continental Europe
1. How Ownership Blocks Create Potential for Holdup
The scenarios described in previous sections do not apply in the presence
of a controlling shareholder. Concentrated ownership of shares, even in the
case of large, listed corporations, prevails in virtually every country except
the United States and the United Kingdom, and particularly in the large
Western European countries. 15 6 Team production theory would require
modification in order to prove applicable because it assumes powerless
shareholders.5 7
Under prototypical concentrated ownership, a large shareholder holds
both considerable voting power and considerable cash flow rights. The well-
known advantage of concentrated ownership is that a large or controlling
shareholder with extensive cash flow rights has a strong incentive to monitor
managerial misconduct. 5 " Thus, the classic Berle-Means managerial agency
problem of the separation of ownership and control is eliminated. 5 9 How-
ever, as a negative side-effect, large and controlling shareholders have the
156. Marco Becht & Ailsa RoelI, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, 43 EUR. ECON.
REV. 1049 (1999); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corpora-
tions, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002); Gilson, supra note 3, at 1645 (summarizing the empirical evidence);
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FIN. 471 (1999). Contra Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States (June
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991363 (suggesting that dis-
persed ownership is not more prevalent in the United States than elsewhere).
157. Cf Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 909.
158. E.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 18, at 754-55.
159. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
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opportunity to obtain private benefits of control.160 Controlling shareholders
are typically able to siphon money out of the firm by entering into non-
arm's-length deals with the firm or by exploiting corporate opportunities.16,
Thus, leaving stakeholder issues aside, the most important policy goal of
corporate law in such systems is to keep large shareholders' opportunities to
abuse their position in check.
However, concentrated ownership also exacerbates the holdup problem
vis-a-vis nonshareholder constituencies. 162 In a firm with a controlling share-
holder, that shareholder can easily replace the firm's managers. As suggested
by Charreaux and Desbri~res, in a situation of crisis, management, in order
to avoid eviction, will find it beneficial to reduce the share of firm value
assigned to stakeholders-employees in particular-and "to maintain that
of the dominant shareholder so that this one may obtain at least the normal
market return." 161 To a certain extent, stakeholders instead of shareholders
thus become the firm's residual risk bearers. 164 The controlling shareholder
is in a position to induce managers to pressure other constituencies into
giving up quasi-rents and rents on their specific investment. Naturally, this
kind of opportunism would be in the ex post interest of shareholders irre-
spective of capital structure. Under dispersed ownership, collective action
problems impede the required coordination, 165 and these problems are rein-
forced by certain aspects of U.S. corporate law. 166
Shareholders' incentive to expropriate stakeholders is financial, as a con-
siderable share of holdup profits will end up in shareholder pockets. If a
shareholder (or shareholder coalition) has both a controlling interest and a
large claim to cash flow, that individual or group has a monetary incentive
and an opportunity. Thus, keeping other factors constant, holdup risk for
other constituencies will increase with a higher degree of explicit share-
holder influence-which in turn will typically increase with a higher share
for the controlling shareholder-and with an increase in the controlling
shareholder's monetary share in the firm.
The argument that holdup problems are small in the United States com-
pared with other jurisdictions rests on the insulation of managers from
shareholder influence. In an extreme version of a Berle-Means firm, where
160. See generally Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITU-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 371, 374-75 (Claude Minard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); Shleifer & Vishny,
supra note 18, at 758-61.
161. See Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 22 (2000).
162. Similarly, the presence of blockholders may be associated with a higher cost of debt. See Ash-
baugh-Skaife et al., supra note 21, at 240.
163. Charreaux & Desbrilres, supra note 18, at 116.
164. Id.
165. Habib, supra note 18, at 146-48. Some evidence, however, suggests that dispersed ownership
may increase firm value in some circumstances. Id. at 148.
166. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.1; see also Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 848; Hansmann & Kraak-
man, supra note 100, at 41-44.
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insulation is complete in the sense that shareholders are unable to influence
managers, managers would also have no reason to use their business judg-
ment to promote shareholder interests if there are tradeoffs with the inter-
ests of other constituencies. 167 Managers may have opportunities to gain
advantages from all constituencies without favoring particular groups; thus,
the primary beneficiaries of holdup are shareholders, not managers. How-
ever, as the result of controlling the firm's business activities on a day-to-day
basis, managers may feel socially attached to employees and even long-term
business partners. 16 The classical moral hazard problem analyzed under the
principal-agent paradigm of corporate governance is therefore likely to be
more severe than the expropriation of other constituencies. Dispersed share-
holders, who are distant from management in day-to-day decision making
and, as a group, cannot exit the company, 169 may therefore be in the weakest
position of all. Consequently, in such an extreme version of a Berle-Means
firm, stakeholder problems may be nearly irrelevant.
2. Explicit Shareholder Influence in Continental Europe
It is easy to see that controlling shareholders in Continental Europe typi-
cally have a strong influence on management. French law,1 70 for example,
allows shareholders to revoke the appointment of members of the board of
directors (conseil d'administration) at any time, 7 ' without giving a reason. 172
Similarly, the conseil, which appoints the CEO of a company (directeur gen-
6ral),173 can remove the CEO at any time. 174 Assistant general managers
167. Habib, supra note 18, at 147 (arguing that "not being a shareholder, [the manager] has nothing
to gain from [reneging on promises of deferred compensation made to employees]"). The situation in a
Berle-Means firm approximates that in a non-profit organization ("NPO"), which is characterized by a
non-distribution constraint (i.e., there is not even an interest group with financial incentives to monitor
management and interfere in decision making). The generally accepted explanation for the existence of
the non-distribution constraint is that the NPO's stakeholder would object to an owner receiving profits
because of severe information asymmetries regarding the NPO's product, Henry Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 846-48 (1980), or because it has non-contractible properties that
could not be verified by courts, Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J.
PUB. ECON. 99 (2001).
168. See, e.g., ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, Supra note 17, at 34 (arguing that "these managerial
tendencies fit well with employees' goals").
169. WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 304-05.
170. This section describes only the predominant one-tier structure. Since the 1966 reforms, French
corporate law has alternatively offered a German-style two-tier structure with directoire and conseil de
surveillance. As of 2002, 6,491 among 150,000 socitOs anonymes had a dualistic structure, but about
twenty-five percent of the CAC 40 stock index has this structure. See PHILIPPE MERLE & ANNE FAUCHON,
DROIT COMMERCIAL. SOCIETES COMMERCIALES 417 n.2 (10th ed. 2005).
171. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.225-18 (Fr.).
172. Chambre Commerciale et Financi~re [Cass. Com.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], Bor-
deaux, Oct. 26, 1959, J.C.P. 1960, 11, 11696 (Fr.); Jan. 3, 1985, REPERTOIRE Du NOTARIAT DEPR9NOIS
1987, 620, J. Honorat (Fr.); see MICHEL GERMAIN & Louis VOGEL, TRAIT9 DE DROIT COMMERCIAL,
n.1653 (G. Ripert & R. Roblot eds., 18th ed. 2001).
173. C. COM. art. L.225-51-1. Before the NRE Act of 2001, Law No. 2001-420 of May 15, 2001,
Journal Officiel de la Ripublique Franlaise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 16, 2001, p. 7776,
the directeur ginral had to be a member of the conseil d'administration.
174. C. CoM. art. L.225-55.
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(directeurs dAlgus), who are appointed upon proposal by the CEO,1 75 can
likewise be removed.1 76 While some commentators emphasize the strong
position of the "PDG" (president directeur general), who is both president of
the conseil and CEO,1 77 his power is constrained by large shareholders and
the potential threat of replacement. 178 Before the 2001 reform, 179 sharehold-
ers were even able to directly remove the PDG by revoking his appointment
to the conseil, as he was required to be one of its members.180 Similarly, in
Italy, under the traditional system of board organization' 8' the appointment
of a director (member of the consiglio di amministrazione) can be revoked at
any time by shareholders. However, the firm may have to pay damages to
the director if the revocation was without cause.18 2 In both countries, these
provisions are mandatory. 83 In countries such as France and Italy, where
management is kept on a short leash by large shareholders, the potential for
holdup of stakeholders is high. Large shareholders either control the board
175. Id. art. L.225-53.
176. Id. art. L.225-55.
177. E.g., Christiane Alcouffe, Judges and CEOs: French Aspects of Corporate Governance, 9 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 127, 129 (2000).
178. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 41 ("The shareholder majority nevertheless holds
the PDG at the end of a short leash by virtue of the majority's removal power."); see also GUYON, supra
note 95, at 289 (characterizing the general shareholder meeting and not the board as the "supreme
organ" of the company); Yves Guyon, L'dvolution Rdcente des Assembles D'Actionnaires en Droit Franfais, in
MELANGES Guy FLATTET 39 (Bernard Dutoit, Josef Hofstetter & Paul Pioret eds., 1985).
179. See generally NRE Act of 2001, supra note 173.
180. GERMAIN & VOGEL, supra note 172, at 453. The reform may have slightly strengthened the
position of management by stipulating damages if there is no cause for dismissal (unless the directeur
gt'sal is also a member of the conseil). See C. COM. art. L.225-55.
181. Since 2004, Italian firms can choose between three different types of organizational structure.
Decree-Law No. 6, Jan. 17, 2003, Gazz Uff. No. 17, Supp. Ord. 8/L, Jan. 22, 2003 (Italy). For an
overview of recent Italian corporate law reforms, see Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Guidici & Mario Stella
Richter, Company Law Reform in Italy: Real Progress?, in 69 RABEiS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUsLANDiSCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 658, 659-61 (2005). Besides the traditional structure (consiglio di am-
ministrazione and collegio sindacale, as discussed in the text), firms may choose an English-style monistic
and a German-style dualistic structure. In both systems, shareholders have the power to elect and revoke
the appointment of managing directors at any time. See CODICE CIViLE [C.c.) art. 2409(19) (Italy) (board
members in a monistic system), C.c. art. 2409 (9) para. 3, para. 5 (managing board members in dualistic
system), C.c. art. 2409 (20) para. 5 (supervisory board members).
182. See C.c. art. 2383 para. 3.
183. For France, see GERMAIN & VOGEL, supra note 172, at 1653; MERLE & FAUCHON, Supra note 170,
at 386. For Italy, see 1 GUIDO CAPOZZI, LE SOCIETA DI CAPITALI, LE SOCIETA COOPERATIVE E LE MUTE
AssICURATRici 679 (2005). The Italian board of auditors (collegio sindacale), which is also elected by
shareholders, is of less interest here. Its members are elected by shareholders, but can only be removed for
cause. C.c. art. 2400(1), (2). It is less involved with individual business decisions and strategy than the
German supervisory board. See, e.g., Ferrarini et al., supra note 181, at 676-77; Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick
C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe-Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 135, 158-59 (2004). The
duties of the board of auditors are set out in C.c. art. 2403 para. 1. See also Eugenio Ruggiero, Italy, in
THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS 79, 106 (Arthur R.
Pinto & Gustavo Visentini eds., 1998).
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through direct representation or can directly threaten the firm's senior man-
agers with removal from their positions. 184
By contrast, German law provides insulation of the board from share-
holder influence as a matter of theory. German Aktiengesellschaften have a
mandatory two-tier board structure; a management board (Vorstand) takes
care of the operations of the company, while a supervisory board (Aufsicht-
srat) is expected to monitor it. Section 76 of the German Stock Corporation
Act (Aktiengesetz), which resembles DGCL section 141, explicitly charges the
management board with the exclusive responsibility of managing the com-
pany s 5 and implies that instructions from the supervisory board or share-
holders are invalid. 8 6 The provision is mandatory. 87 The management
board's independence is reinforced by appointment and dismissal proce-
dures. The supervisory board elects and dismisses management board mem-
bers, but premature dismissal requires a showing of cause, which includes a
vote of no confidence by shareholders. 88 Thus, dismissal requires agreement
between major shareholders and the supervisory board. Supervisory board
members are elected by shareholders,'8 9 have a period in office of up to five
years, 190 and normally can only be dismissed prematurely by a supermajority
of three quarters.' 9' Interestingly, the motivational report accompanying the
1937 Aktiengesetz that first introduced this structure' 92 states:
184. See, e.g., Ruggiero, supra note 183, at 83-84 (describing the influence of controlling shareholders
and coalitions on listed Italian firms).
185. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act), Sept. 6, 1965, BGBI. I at 1089, § 76 (1)
(F.R.G.).
186. Wolfgang Hefermehl & Gerald Spindler, § 76, cmt. 21, in 3 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
AKTIENGESET'Z 58, 66-67 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2000); Hans-Joachim Mertens,
§ 76, cmt. 42, in 2 KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 1, 37 (Wolfang Zblner ed., 2d ed. 1988);
UWE HOFFER, 53 AKTIENGESETZ § 76, cmt. 10 (6th ed. 2006) (also pointing out that there is no direct
fiduciary relationship between either a management board and an individual shareholder or a manage-
ment board and the shareholder meeting).
187. HUFFER, supra note 186, § 23, cmt. 36; see also Andreas Pentz, § 23 cmt. 156, in I MUNCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESErz 491, 541 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2000). On
control agreements, see generally Hertig & Kanda, supra note 101, at 71, 86; Hertig & Kanda, supra note
81, at 124-25; Peter Hommelhoff, Protection of Minority Shareholders, Investors and Creditors in Corporate
Groups: The Strengths and Weaknesses of German Corporate Group Law, 2 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 61, 64-66
(2001).
188. AktG § 84 (3).
189. AktG § 101 (1). Half of the board members are employee representatives, but in the case ofa tie
the vote of the chairman (who is one of the shareholder-appointed members) is decisive. On codetermina-
tion, see infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
190. The rule in AktG § 102 (1) on the term of office depends on when the annual general meeting is
held, but effectively results in a period of about five years. See HOFFER, supra note 186, § 102, cmt. 2.
191. AktG § 103 (1). The charter may entitle the owners of registered shares (with restricted transfer-
ability) to appoint up to one third of the board members who are appointed by shareholders; the respec-
tive shareholder also has the right to revoke the appointment at any time. AktG §§ 101 (2), 103 (2).
Supervisory board members may be removed for cause by a court. AktG § 103 (3).
192. On the historic development, see Wolfgang Hefermehl & Johannes Semler, Verfassung der Aktien-
gesellschaft: Vorbemerkung, § 76, cmts. 10-20, in 3 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZuM AKTIENGESETZ 3, 8-10
(Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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Under current law, the shareholder meeting is the supreme deci-
sion making body of the corporation; the authority of the man-
agement board and the supervisory board is derived from it.
Fundamental decisions regarding the fate of the corporation are
made by the majority of the providers of funds, who are personally
not responsible, who usually lack precise and competent insight
into business and the firm's operations, and who typically put the
concerns of capital into the foreground. The development of corpora-
tions has shown that conflicts of interest and power struggles be-
tween the administration and the shareholder meeting tend to
develop, which are by no means to the advantage of the company
and business life. 193
The report goes on to explain that the law is intended to limit the role of the
shareholder meeting. The quoted passage addresses concerns raised by share-
holder empowerment, one of which appears to be close to the motivation of
team production theory, where a lopsided focus on capital is seen as harmful.
The act concurrently introduced section 70(1), which required directors "to
manage the corporation as the good of the enterprise and its retinue and the
common weal of folk and realm demand.' 1 94 The provision set out the doc-
trine of the "Unternehmensinteresse," under which the institutional interest
of the firm transcends the interests of specific constituencies. Although the
provision was introduced in 1937 and has linguistically been influenced by
Nazism, 195 it was not exclusive to that ideology. The origins of the doctrine
can be traced to earlier writers such as Walther Rathenau, 196 and it reflects a
broader trend in German political and economic theory of the 1920s and
193. FRIEDRICH KLAUSING, GESETZ OBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN
AUF AKTIEN 56 (1937) (official report introducing the reform, own translation). A more ideological
aspect of the strengthening of the corporate administration in this reform was the Fu'hrerprinzip (leader
principle) that stood at the heart of Nazi ideology. However, it was not implemented to its fullest
possible extent. See id. at 63*-64*.
194. Translation following Detlev Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the Ger-
man, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 40 (1966).
195. See id. (using the term "retinue" to translate the German "Gefolgschaft," which "Nazism
claimed to find in the teutonic past," and describing a pseudo-feudal relationship between the firm and
its employees).
196. WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTIENWESEN. EINE GESCHAFTLICHE BETRACHTUNG. (1917). The
famous term "Unternehmen an sich" ("enterprise as such") was coined by Haussmann, who used it to
describe and criticize Rathenau's theory. See FRiTZ HAUSSMANN, VOM AKTIENWESEN UND VOM AK-
TIENRECHT (1928). Other scholars of the time viewed it more favorably. Rathenau was an industrialist
and a moderate liberal politician, who was serving as German foreign minister when he was assassinated
by nationalists in 1922. However, Friedrich Klausing, the editor of the motivational report accompany-
ing the 1937 Aktiengesetz, was most likely a Nazi. He committed suicide after being dismissed as the
rector of the University of Prague in 1944, when his son had been identified as one of the conspirators in
the assassination attempt on Hitler of July 20. See Bernd Riithers, Spiegelbild einer Verschwtrung: Zwei
Abschiedsbriefe zum 20. Juli 1944, 14 JURISTENZEITUNG 689 (2005). For a detailed review of Rathenau's
and Haussmann's partly contradicting ideas, see ARNDT RIECHERS, DAS 'UNTERNEHMEN AN SiCH' 7-25
(1996).
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1930s. 19 7 When the requirement to promote the "good of the enterprise"
was dropped in the 1965 reform, the stated reason was that it was self-
evident that the interests of employees and of the public had to be taken
into consideration. 198 The doctrine continues to play a role in German cor-
porate law. 199 However, it is no longer seen as the metaphysical interest of
the business "as such," but as a proxy for the interests of various groups that
must be reconciled.2 00
Nevertheless, actual German corporate governance practice departs from
the law on the books attempting to insulate management from shareholders.
Large German firms are often controlled by single large shareholders, and
sometimes by medium-sized ones, 20 who exercise control by forming coali-
tions and electing confidants to the supervisory board. Members of the man-
agement board must face re-election after a period of at most five years, 20 2 at
which time they face the scrutiny of these directors and, by extension, of
core shareholders. 20 3 Furthermore, the requirement of cause to remove board
members prematurely can be met by a vote of no confidence. Due to the
close connection between large shareholders and supervisory board members
and the fact that supervisory board members themselves can be removed by
a supermajority of seventy-five percent in the shareholder meeting, manag-
ers no longer enjoying the confidence of the controlling shareholder or coali-
tion will typically be unable to maintain their position. 20 4
Controlling shareholders and coalitions are therefore typically able to im-
pose their will on the firm by threatening to replace the managers. Em-
ployee representatives on the board are typically not in a position to object,
197. See RIECHERS, supra note 196, at 26-42.
198. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AKTIENGESETZ WITH COMMITTEE REPORT 97 (Bruno Kropff
ed., 1965).
199. Notably, the Bundesgerichtshof referred to the "Unternehmensinteresse" in its Mannesmann
opinion. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice), May 5, 2005, 59 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 529 (560) (F.R.G); see, e.g., Gerald Spindler, Vorstandsvergiitungen und
Abfindungen auf den aktienrechtlichen Prifstand-Das Mannesmann-Urteil des BGH, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 349, 352 (2006). Recent scholarship influenced by law and economics tends
to attack the doctrine. See, e.g., Holger Fleischer, § 76, cmts. 30-31, in KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ
(Gerald Spindler & Eberhard Stilz eds., 2007).
200. HOFFER, supra note 186, § 76, cmt. 15.
201. See Marco Becht & Ekkehart Boehmer, Voting Control in German Corporations, 23 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 1 (2003); Ekkehard Boehmer, Who Controls German Corporations?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REGIMES 268 (Joseph A. McCahery er al. eds., 2002); Jeremy Edwards & Marcus Nibler, Corporate Gov-
ernance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership Concentration, 15 ECON. POL'Y 239, 246-51 (2000); F.
Jens Kbke, New Evidence on Ownership Structures in Germany, 34 KREDIT UND KAPITAL 257, 268-72
(2001); Dariusz W6jcik, Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings
1997-2001, 35 ENV'T & PLAN. A 1431 (2003).
202. AktG § 84 (1).
203. Peter Doralt, Die Unabhdngigkeit des Vorstands nach sterreichischem und deutschen Aktienrecht-Schein
und Wirklichkeit, in DIE GESTALTUNG DER ORGANISATIONSDYNAMIK. FESTSCHRIFT FOR OSKAR GRCJN 31,
47 (Werner H. Hoffmann ed., 2003); Jean du Plessis & Claus Luttermann, The Dominant Role of the
German Banks and New Players in the German Financial Sector, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 205, 209-210 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 2007).
204. Doralt, supra note 203, at 47-48.
2009 / The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence
as the vote of the president of the supervisory board-a shareholder repre-
sentative-is decisive in the case of a tie.20 5 Exceptions are possible, such as
cases where groups of shareholders fall out among each other and employee
representatives are decisive. However, as a general matter, shareholder influ-
ence as such would be strong enough to extract rents and quasi-rents from
stakeholders, even under German corporate law.
3. Holdup Incentives in Spite of European Pyramid Structures
One might object that the large financial incentive for holdup may be
eliminated by divergences between financial ownership and control, such as
deviations from the "one share-one vote" principle that is normally thought
to create optimal incentives for efficient shareholder decisions. 20 6 Such struc-
tures are sometimes thought to be common in Continental Europe, or at
least in some European countries. Examples are dual-class shares, cross-own-
ership of shares, and most interestingly, stock pyramids. 20 7 Pyramidal struc-
tures, if carried to the extreme, may allow a controller to vote the majority
of the stock of a publicly traded firm while owning only a minimum of
capital and cash flow rights. For example, if shareholder A owns fifty percent
of the shares of company B, which in turn holds thirty percent of publicly
traded firm C, A will effectively vote thirty percent of C's shares with a
financial stake of merely fifteen percent. Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin
describe the case of Telecom Italia, where, in 2005, one person controlled
eighteen percent of the voting stock with a capital share of only 0.7% of
capital by means of a chain of four intermediary firms (two of them publicly
traded).20 8
Pyramidal structures and other divergences from "one share-one vote" are
usually considered problematic from an agency perspective because they al-
low the controller to externalize his decisions on minority shareholders. 20 9
Extreme types of pyramids approximate the Berle-Means corporation in im-
portant respects: the manager, without owning much stock, is fully in con-
trol of the firm and minimally accountable to minority shareholders. Hostile
takeovers are impossible. Thus, pyramids combine the worst features of both
dispersed and concentrated ownership. 21 0 One might think that the control-
205. Mirbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Act], May 4, 1976, BGBI. I at 1153, § 29
(2) (F.R.G.); see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 36.
206. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20
J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988); HART, supra note 35, at 186-89; EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 24, at
72-74.
207. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Owner-
ship, and Dual-Class Equity, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 297-301 (Randall K.
Morck ed., 2000).
208. Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 117, 119-21 (2007).
209. Guido Ferrarini, OneShare-One Vote: A European Rule?, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REv. 147, 160
(2006).
210. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 207, at 295.
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ler of such a firm could function as a "mediating hierarch," as under Blair
and Stout's team production theory. Holdup problems would be largely
eliminated because the controlling shareholder lacks a financial incentive. 21'
However, a closer look reveals that even if the controller of the firm only has
a nominal entitlement to the firm's cash flow, holdup is still an issue in
subsidiaries at the bottom of the pyramid.
First, benefits that can be squeezed out of the firm on the bottom of the
pyramid by reneging on implicit deals with nonshareholder constituencies
could be used for projects at another level of the pyramid. Assume that
shareholder X, through a chain of subsidiaries, owns ten percent of the cash
flow rights of Widget Holding ("WidHold"), but controls fifty percent of
votes. WidHold owns fifty percent of Widget Operative ("WidOp"), which
is thus indirectly controlled by X. In theory, X's financial holdup incentive
should be only five percent compared to a situation where he is the sole
owner of WidOp.
However, the controller X may be able to obtain a share of the gains
exceeding five percent at the cost of other shareholders-perhaps from lower
wages-after threatening employees with plant closures. Such techniques
are well known from the debate on agency conflicts under concentrated
ownership. These techniques include tunneling through transactions be-
tween WidOp and WidHold under terms unfavorable to WidOp,21 2 trans-
actions between WidOp and X under terms unfavorable to WidOp, and
stock dilution. 213 WidOp could be merged into an entity controlled by X or
WidHold under an exchange ratio that benefits X at the expense of
WidHold's other shareholders. 214 If either is possible, X will be able to in-
crease the ratio from five percent to a higher amount by diverting the profit
into an entity in which her share is higher. The degree to which the control-
ling shareholder benefits depends on how much must be given to minority
shareholders. Tunneling opportunities and the possibility of merging the
two firms and diluting the minority's stock will increase the controller's
incentive to hold up stakeholders. By contrast, if X cannot illicitly increase
her share in holdup gains, and holdup gains only accrue to her through
dividends and the share price, minority shareholders proportionally share in
these gains. When minority shareholders share in holdup gains, the reduced
monetary incentives for the controlling shareholder suggest that she will not
211. Regarding agency cost, it is often said that pyramidal structures eliminate the large shareholder's
incentive to monitor managers. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 207, at 301, 305 (suggesting an increase in
agency costs); K6ke, supra note 201, at 264.
212. See Johnson et al., supra note 161.
213. For a definition and discussion of techniques, see, for example, Conac et al., supra note 96, at
523-24; Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Cicotello, Unbundling and Measuring Tunneling,
(Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 17, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract= 1030529 (distinguishing between asset tunneling, cash flow tunneling, and equity
tunneling).
214. The controlled entity could either be within the pyramid at a level where X's financial stake is
higher, outside of the pyramid, or even within another pyramid controlled by X.
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engage in holdup in marginal cases where gains are outweighed by personal
holdup costs such as reduced empire-building possibilities or loss of reputa-
tional commitments to good relations with stakeholders. 2 15 Stakeholders
may therefore benefit from improved protection of minority shareholders.
Second, even if some pyramids greatly reduce the controller's holdup in-
centive, this incentive may resurface under circumstances where funds are
needed at a higher level of the pyramid. In the above example, WidHold
might experience financial constraints and need additional liquidity, which
short-term holdup gains in WidOp may provide, as in an exogenously in-
duced crisis or a leveraged buyout of the parent firm. While X's personal
advantage may not be significant, as her cash flow rights in both WidHold
and WidOp are relatively small, the requirement to make interest payments
in WidHold creates a joint interest-by all of WidHold's shareholders, its
creditors, and even its employees-that triggers pressure to extrude finan-
cial means from its subsidiary WidOp. Despite the fact that the personal
financial incentive of X, the controller of both firms, is weaker than in a
situation where she directly owns a large share of WidOp, the joint pressure
from WidHold's stakeholders may make up for that difference. X is unlikely
to resist because her financial share in WidHold is still bigger than her share
in WidOp. Hence, her priority will be to assure the survival and long-term
prosperity of the parent firm and to satisfy the demands of its stakeholders,
rather than to maintain friendly relations with stakeholders on the subsidi-
ary level. Such a situation, triggered by a crisis or a leveraged buyout, may
even pit stakeholders against stakeholders, as nonshareholder constituencies
on the parent level may benefit from holdup of stakeholders of the
subsidiary.
Third, the controller can sell his share of the company at any time. 2' 6 A
sale can happen at any level of the pyramid and might be particularly lucra-
tive if the pyramidal separation between ownership and control is removed.
The new controller would then have a much greater financial incentive to
hold up stakeholders. Hence, even if there is no current holdup risk, there is
always a potential one, and even this potential risk should discourage spe-
cific investment.
Finally, it is important to note that pyramids in which the controller
actually holds a substantial chunk of equity in the bottom subsidiary seem
to be more the rule than the extreme form described by Enriques and
Volpin. 217 For example, if the controlling entity owns twenty percent of cash
215. For a discussion of long-term commitment by large shareholders, see infra Part III.C.4.
216. For example, in Germany, while there is little hostile takeover activity, there is a thriving mar-
ket of controlling blocks. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership and Control of German Corporations, 14
REv. ECON. STUD. 943, 955 (2001).
217. Empirical evidence is available at La Porta et al., supra note 156, at 498-500, 511 (concluding
that, while pyramids are common, the magnitude of deviations from the one share-one vote ideal tends to
be small); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation ofOwnership and Control in
East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. EcoN. 81, 100 (2000) (reporting mean ratios of cash flow rights to
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flow rights but forty percent of votes, the financial interest is certainly sig-
nificant and distinguishable from ownership stakes of managers of U.S. com-
panies. In an empirical study of ownership structures in the German
manufacturing industry, Kdke concludes that the agency problem resulting
from pyramidal structures "is probably irrelevant for most German
firms." 218
4. Large Ownership Blocks as Such Do Not Create a Commitment to
Stakeholders
Several scholars have previously observed that holdup of nonshareholder
constituencies may be facilitated by large shareholders. 219 By contrast, others
have suggested that, particularly in Europe, the long-term horizon of large
financial investors may facilitate specific investment by managers220 or im-
plicit contractual relationships and commitment by other nonshareholder
constituencies .221
The claim that large shareholders may alleviate holdup problems is quite
puzzling. While it is commonly thought that large shareholders in control-
oriented finance systems hold shares for extended periods of time,222 the
existence of a large shareholder as such likely does not facilitate specific in-
vestment. Such a claim would assume a constant threat of hostile takeovers
that is not in fact present in the United States. It is true that managers,
employees, and other stakeholders are shielded from hostile takeovers by
large shareholders under concentrated ownership. However, holdup can take
place for two reasons. First, large shareholders themselves can obtain finan-
cial benefits. Second, large shareholders refraining from ex post opportunism
control rights between 0.602 and 0.941 for East Asian economies); Franks & Mayer, supra note 216, at
950-51 (reporting an average ratio between voting and cash flow rights of 1.6 in a sample of 38 German
pyramids); K6ke, supra note 201, at 280-81 (reporting a ratio between cash flow and voting rights of less
than seventy-five percent in only ten percent of a sample of 5788 German manufacturing firms with a
pyramidal structure); Faccio & Lang, supra note 156, at 392 (reporting mean ratios of cash flow to control
rights between .740 and .941 for 13 Western European countries); Roberto Barontini & Lorenzo Caprio,
The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance. Evidence from Continental Europe 43 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 88/2005, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
675983 (reporting a wedge between cash flow and control rights of more than twenty percent in only
11.6% of firms).
218, Kdke, supra note 201, at 285.
219. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 18, at 758; Charreaux & Desbri~res, supra note 18, at 116; see also
Habib, supra note 18 (mathematical model in the leveraged buyout context); Pagano & Volpin, supra note
153, at 841 (modeling managers' incentive to voluntarily protect employees in order to make the firm
unattractive as a target of takeovers, with the incentive resting on managers holding only a small stake).
220. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership and Control in Europe, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE Dic-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 722, 728-29 (Peter E. Newman ed., 1998); William W. Bratron
& Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 23, 27 (Joseph A. McCahery et at. eds., 2002).
221. See, e.g., Stephan Woolcock, Competition Among Forms of Corporate Governance in the European Com-
munity: The Case of Britain, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 179, 183 (Suzanne Berger
& Ronald Dore eds., 1996); Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate
Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447, 451 (2003).
222. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 220, at 26.
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may sell to a third party, even when they are unwilling to hold up stake-
holders themselves.
With regard to managers, economic theory already tends to emphasize
that specific investment is discouraged by concentrated ownership, as man-
agers only retain their position in the firm at the whim of the dominating
shareholder or coalition. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi discuss the tradeoff
between reducing agency cost through monitoring by large shareholders, on
one hand, and managerial initiative, on the other, which is stifled by con-
straints imposed by blockholders. Managerial initiative, which is interpreted
as a form of specific investment, is avoided ex ante if managers cannot be
certain to receive the private benefit of being able to retain control over the
firm ex post if there is a blockholder. 22 3
The same reasoning applies to groups such as employees, 224 where the
presence of a large or controlling shareholder as such cannot signal commit-
ment not to engage in holdup. Consider a fully entrenched manager not
subject to explicit or implicit shareholder influence and a controlling share-
holder with full control over the firm's crucial business decisions, both con-
sidering whether to threaten employees with redundancy to increase profits.
For reasons discussed above, the entrenched manager's interest may to some
degree be aligned with that of employees. 221 Similar reasons might apply to
the controlling shareholder if he actually controls the firm's operations.
However, while the entrenched manager draws no personal benefit from
holdup, the controlling shareholder reaps a big chunk of the financial gains.
Thus, assuming that the same countervailing incentives apply both to the
manager and the controlling shareholder, the latter will be more eager to
expropriate nonshareholder constituencies. Naturally, the manager's incen-
tives may be different because of what I have described as implicit shareholder
influence, that is, when the threat of a hostile takeover is considerable or
managerial incentives are otherwise closely aligned with shareholders. 22 6
One reason why concentrated ownership may facilitate specific invest-
ment is the difficulty of selling a large share in a publicly held firm. 227
However, opportunism vis-A-vis nonshareholder constituencies does not nec-
essarily imply a sale of the share or even the threat of liquidating the firm, in
which case a large shareholder would indeed typically incur losses. In fact,
the assertion that holdup is easier under dispersed ownership is often made
223. Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value ofthe
Firm, 112 Q. J. EcoN. 693, 693-94 (1997); see also Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real
Authority in Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997).
224. See Burkart et al., supra note 223, at 702; Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Alisa Ro6ll, Corporate
Law and Governance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 829, 855 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007); BREALEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 949 (both extending this reasoning to employees).
225. See supra Parts I.B, III.B.2.
226. Managerial incentives are much less closely aligned with shareholders in the United States than
in the United Kingdom, a fact that will be discussed in Part VI.
227. Aguilera & Jackson, supra note 221, at 451.
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with regard to the possibility af a hostile takeover, 228 when a dispersed own-
ership structure is replaced by a dominating shareholder.
From the perspective of stakeholders fearing holdup, the counterpart to a
hostile takeover in a controlled firm is a voluntary sale of control.229 Unlike
hostile takeovers, such sales are unlikely to change managerial incentives, as
managers under concentrated ownership are under constant supervision by
controlling shareholders. 230 However, they may influence stakeholders' in-
centives regarding specific investment.23' As the current shareholder will
effectively decide on holdup, the decision whether to sell the firm has a large
impact on the potential for holdup. Even if the current shareholder is un-
willing to hold up stakeholders, a purchaser may be. If short-term share-
holder value can be increased through holdup, a buyer may offer a price to
the current shareholder in excess of the current value of the firm. Thus, the
protection of stakeholders hinges on whether the controlling shareholder is
(1) both unable and unwilling to expropriate nonshareholder constituencies
himself, and (2) also not susceptible to a lucrative offer from a third party
(which will inevitably come if holdup benefits are sufficiently large). For the
second condition to be met, the controlling shareholder must draw what is
known as a non-pecuniary private benefit.232
Whether non-pecuniary private benefits arise depends on the identity of
the shareholder. First, the controlling shareholder may be a government en-
tity whose agents have to bear a political cost if they act against workers'
interests, such as by cutting jobs. However, whether a government entity
fosters specific investments depends on the stability of political preferences.
The political process may at times lead to the predominance of the view that
state-controlled enterprises should be run in a more efficient way in order to
save taxpayers' money.
The second possible situation under which non-pecuniary benefits might
be present is family ownership. Members of founding families may feel per-
sonally attached to the business of their forefathers, and they may sometimes
even have a personal commitment to the firm and its employees that will
228. See, e.g., Franks & Mayer, supra note 220, at 729.
229. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 9, at 543-45 (describing BMW's sale of Rover to the "Phoenix
consortium"; BMW would have liquidated the firm if it had not found a buyer. The acquirer (Phoenix)
pressured unions into making concessions, in spite of labor law strengthening their negotiating posi-
tion.); see also Martin J. Conyon et al., Do Hostile Mergers Destroy Jobs?, 45 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427
(2001) (finding no significant difference in impact on labor demand between firms acquired through
hostile takeover and voluntary sale).
230. Cf Klaus Gugler & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, The Effects of Mergers on Company Employment in the USA
and Europe, 22 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 481, 497 (2004) (summarizing the empirical finding that in the
United States, only tender offers, but not other deals, have a significant negative effect on employment).
231. See Coates, supra note 20, at 858-59 (criticizing the applicability of team production theory in
controlled firms by suggesting that buyers will be motivated exclusively by shareholder concerns in a
friendly merger).
232. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 1663-64 (defining non-pecuniary benefits as "forms of psychic and
other benefits that, without more, involve no transfer of real company resources and do not dispropor-
tionately dilute the value of the company's stock to a diversified investor").
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make it hard to close production sites. Particularly in small countries, the
position as a founding family may confer additional benefits in political and
social life. 233 However, not all such benefits are necessarily passed on to
subsequent generations. 234 Later generations may lose interest in the firm or
lack the entrepreneurial skills of their progenitors. Non-pecuniary benefits
may thus result in a deterioration of the firm's market position over time,
making a sale of control to a more effective controller more lucrative.2 1 5
Thus, while such non-contractible private benefits may create a temporary
shield against holdup, 2 6 at some point the combination of efficiency and
holdup gains may become too tempting. Even in countries with a long-
standing tradition of family control in many important firms, such as
France, family influence is not always seen as positive in politics. 23 7 Even
without conclusive evidence about the effects of family control, this analysis
supports the intuition that there may be considerable conflicts of interest
between family owners and workers.
The third possibility for non-pecuniary benefits is the controlling share-
holders' ability to enter into transactions with the firm on unfavorable
terms. 238 This may occur if another business run by the controlling share-
holder complements that of the firm. Take the example of firm A producing
motors and firm B producing cars. As the controlling shareholder of A, B
could gain from buying motors below the usual market price. Not every
potential purchaser of the share in A would be able to obtain the same
benefit. However, corporate law theory generally disdains this kind of pri-
vate benefit, as it hurts minority investors. 23 9 As minority shareholder pro-
tection improves, this potential shield against holdup will also diminish.2 40
In sum, concentrated ownership as such cannot serve as a commitment
mechanism facilitating specific investment by stakeholders. Even when
233. See Mike Burkart et al., Family Firms, 58 J. FIN. 2167, 2168 (2003) ("A founder may derive
pleasure from having his child run the company that bears the family name."); see also Gilson, supra note
3, at 1666 (describing how leading families in Sweden enjoy social and political positions unparalleled in
a large country like the United States).
234. See Sandy Klasa, Why Do Controlling Families of Public Firms Sell Their Remaining Stake?, 42 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 339 (2007).
235. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 1668-69 (describing the impact of business inheritance on
performance).
236. See Burkart et al., supra note 233, at 2178 (modeling the conditions under which a founding
family retains control because of non-pecuniary benefits in spite of superior abilities of an outside
manager).
237. See, e.g., Antoin E. Murphy, Corporate Ownership in France, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 185, 188 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005) (referring to prime minister
Edouard Daladier's famous criticism of the alleged two hundred "grandes families" in 1930); see also
Marie-Laure Djelic & Rolv Petter Amdam, Americanization in Comparative Perspective: The Managerial
Revolution in France and Norway, 1940-1990, 49 Bus. HisT. 483, 493-94 (2007) (discussing the replace-
ment of family ownership with state ownership in France).
238. See supra note 213.
239. E.g., Djankov et al., supra note 79.
240. The evidence suggests that this kind of shareholder protection has increased over the past years
in several major jurisdictions. See Lele & Siems, supra note 79, at 31.
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holdup is not a current threat, potential holdup by a friendly acquirer may
create a deterrent against firm-specific investment similar to the threat of a
hostile takeover. The final reason why concentrated capital may be willing
to cooperate with labor is the one emphasized in the following section: Legal
institutions strengthening the position of labor leave no other choice.
IV. LEGAL AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO HOLDUP
Given the holdup problem created by concentrated ownership, reasonably
successful corporate governance systems have developed responses. Conspic-
uously, European corporate governance systems with concentrated owner-
ship have much stronger pro-employee institutions than U.S. ones. Part A
gives an overview of these legal responses, and Part B addresses the puzzle
why these rules are almost always mandatory law.
A. Legal Strategies to Contain Shareholder Influence
First, the standard of conduct to which managers are subject sometimes
takes stakeholders into account. Both German and French laws are generally
thought not to adhere to the ideal of shareholder primacy, but to the direc-
tor's obligation to promote the Unternehmensinteresse24 (the interest of the
business) or intdrit social242 (the interest of the association). These are usually
understood to entail a broader corporate objective than mere shareholder
wealth. The practical impact of these provisions and the difference from
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions should not be overestimated, however. The share-
holder primacy norm may not be particularly good law in the United
States, 243 and even the United Kingdom has a statute requiring directors to
"have regard" to the interests of employees and other stakeholders. 244 En-
forcement mechanisms that could be used by employees are absent in all of
these countries, including the Continental European countries, 45 so in a
241. See supra text accompanying notes 183-89.
242. According to the majority opinion, the "social interest" of the firm transcends the mere common
interest of shareholders. See Alcouffe, supra note 177, at 133-35; see also Jean Paillusseau, Entreprise, societ4,
actionnaires, salaris, quels rapports?, RECUEIL DALLOZ, 15 CHRONIQUE 157, 164-65 (1999); Philippe Bis-
sara, L'inttrt Social, 117 REVUE DES SOCiETtS 5, 14 (1999); J. Simon, L'6volution du Gouvernement
dentreprise en France, 77 REVUE nE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DC DROIT COMPARI 368, 373 (2000);
Didier Poracchia, Le nW/e de /'intrt social dans la socited par actions simplifile, 118 REVUE DES SOCiTEs 223,
224 (2000); Didier Danet, Crony capitalism et gouvernement dentreprise, 14 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT ECONOMIQUE 247, 273 (2000). Contra Dominique Schmidt, De /'inttrft social, JCP 1995 6d. E.
1995, 38-488.
243. See supra Part III.A.
244. Formerly Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 309 (1) (U.K.), now Companies Act, 2006, c.46, § 172
(U.K.).
245. For the United States, see John C. Coates IV, Note: State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory:
The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 855 (1989); Springer, supra note 87, at 108, 121;
for the United Kingdom, see D.D. Prentice, A Company and Its Employees: The Companies Act 1980, 10
IND. LAW. J. 1, 4-5 (1981); see also L.S. Sealy, Directors' "Wider" Responsibilities-Problems Conceptual,
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situation of strong, explicit shareholder influence, it is unlikely to be
meaningful.
Second, some legal systems endow employees with decision rights. The
paradigmatic case is German codetermination, which assigns up to half of
the seats on the (supervisory) board to employees (increasing in the number
of the firm's employees) and thus gives limited but explicit influence to this
group. 246 A similarly intrusive system exists in the Netherlands ,247 with
more moderate employee participation systems in Austria, 24 the Czech Re-
public, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, 249 Luxemburg, Denmark, Sweden, and
Finland.25 0
In most cases, the impact on decisions may actually be quite limited,
except where there are significant conflicts between different groups of
shareholders. Even under German "quasi-parity," the decisive vote is cast by
the chairman, who is one of the directors elected by shareholders. 2 1 How-
ever, codetermination may serve as a channel that transmits crucial informa-
tion to employee representatives, 25 2 which puts employees in the position to
act early and improves their bargaining position. Furthermore, a consensus-
oriented culture of the board of directors may make sure that employee in-
terests are taken into consideration. While the debate on whether (and to
what extent) codetermination is efficient has not reached a final conclusion,
the existing evidence allows some preliminary conclusions. A study by Gor-
ton and Schmid found that equal codetermination-fifty percent of seats
held by employees-was linked to a thirty-one percent discount on the
value of the firm's share in the stock market compared to firms where em-
Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 177 (1987); J. E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER
AND RESPONSIBiaTY 83 (Oxford University Press, 1993).
246. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 168 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 27, at 63-64.
247. Firms exceeding a certain size are required to have a supervisory board whose members are
appointed under a system of cooptation and include employee and shareholder representatives. See
STEVEN R. SCHUIT ET AL., CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE NETHERLANDS 111-17 (Kluwer Law
Int'l 2002); Edo Groenewald, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: From the Verdam Report of 1964 to the
Tahakshlat Code of 2003, 6 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 291, 294-95 (2005); Abe de Jong & Alisa Ro~ll,
Financing and Control in the Netherlands, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE
WORLD 467, 473 (Randell K. Morck ed., 2005).
248. For Austria, see Arbeitsverfassungsgesez [ArbVG] [BGB 1] No. 22/1974, as last amended by
BGBI. I No. 104/2006 § 110 (Austria).
249. Thomas Raiser, Unternehmensmithestimmung vor dem Hintergrund europarechtlicher Entwicklungen, in
VERHANDLUNGEN DES SECHSUNDSECHZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES B 1, B 42 (Stiindige Deputa-
tion des deutschen Juristenrages ed., 2006). Slovenia, which initially adopted the German version of
codetermination after independence, abandoned it after its constitutional court declared it unconstitu-
tional. Id. at B 42-B 43).
250. Id. at B 43-B 44; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 62 (noting that, among EU
countries, only Portugal, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom have no employee participation sys-
tems, whereas Ireland, Spain and Greece mandate employee directors only for state-owned firms).
251. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Act), May 4, 1976, BGBI. I at 1153,
§§ 27(2), 29(2) (F.R.G.).
252. See Glrard Hertig, Codetermination as a (Partial) Substitute for Mandatory Disclosure?, 7 EUR. Bus.
ORG. L. REV. 123, 128-30 (2006).
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ployees only held one third of the seats on the board .25  However, Fauver
and Fuerst found a positive effect of "moderate" codetermination-one
third of board members-depending on the industry. According to their
recent study, shareholder value, measured in Tobin's Q, is actually increased
by moderate codetermination in German trade, transportation and manufac-
turing firms. 254 Finally, according to FitzRoy and Kraft, the introduction of
codetermination in 1976 has led to slight gains in productivity. 255 While it
is too early for a final verdict, taking these studies together indicates that
employee decision rights that are not excessive may improve the firm's pro-
ductivity and competitiveness, and that mitigating holdup problems may be
one of the reasons.
Third, and most importantly, employment laws make it difficult and
costly to lay off workers, thus eliminating potential threats that can result in
holdup-type renegotiations. Countries characterized by ownership concen-
tration tend to be those with strong legal job protection . 2 6 In comparative
indices of labor flexibility, the United States is usually found to be one of
the industrial countries with the smallest degree of employment protec-
tion.257 The baseline default rule in virtually all U.S. states is employment at
will, 25 8 meaning that both the employee and, more importantly, the em-
ployer can end the employment relationship at any time without having to
show cause. Further, work conditions can be changed intermittently. 25 9
253. Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor and the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination,
2 J. EUR. EcoN. ASS'N 863 (2004).
254. Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 37. These results do not hold when the employee representatives do
not actually work in the firm but are appointed by unions.
255. Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination. Efficieny and Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. INDoUS.
REL. 233 (2005).
256. For empirical evidence, see Roe, supra note 98, at 263-64; RoE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra
note 17, at 51-52 (finding a negative correlation between the number of medium-sized firms without a
blockholder and the OECD Employment Law Index); Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labour Regulation,
Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity 26 (ECGI Law Working Paper
No. 72/2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898184 (finding a correlation between the employ-
ment law index and blockholder size, but not between collective industrial relations nor social security
and blockholder size); Marc Goergen, Corporate Stakeholders and Trust (ECGI Finance Working Paper No.
213/2008, 21, 34), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1156102 (finding a strong negative correlation);
see also Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal
Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285, 311 (2008) ([Countries that have strong shareholder protection indeed
have weak protection of labor. ... ).
257. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD JoBs STUDY:
EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS, PT. II: THE ADJUSTMENT POTENTIAL 01; THE LABOUR MARKET 74, tbl.
6.7 (1994); see also Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1139, 1362 tbl. 3 (2004).
258. Cf J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the
Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837, 839 (pointing out that only Montana had abrogated the
common law rule by statute); Ellen Dannin, Why At-Will Employment Is Bad for Employees andjust Cause Is
Good for Them, 58 LAB. L.J. 5, 8-9 (2007) (describing Montana and Arizona as the only states with
statutes abrogating the employment-at-will rule).
259. E.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms, Implied
Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84, 84-85 (2007); Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976); Payne v. Western &
Atlantic Railroad, 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884) (first case applying the employment at will rule); see also
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While the case law has developed limitations and modifications in recent
decades, 26° employment-at-will is still the baseline rule of employment in
the United States. While there appears to be no precise recent data, past
estimates on the number of employees subject to it have ranged between
sixty percent 261 and seventy to seventy-five percent 262 of the U.S. private-
sector, non-agricultural workforce.
By contrast, in Continental European jurisdictions, employers are often
required to show a good reason for ending an employment relationship. For
example, in Germany, redundancies of employment relationships that lasted
more than six months require a "social justification, 263 which means that,
if the employer cannot show cause, he must show a compelling operational
requirement. Termination of the employment relationship must be a mea-
sure of last resort.2 64 Similarly, in France a cause reelle et serieuse, which could
be a reorganization of the enterprise, 265 has been required since 1973266 and
might be scrutinized by a court.267 Furthermore, cumbersome procedural
requirements must be met. 260 The need to obtain administrative authoriza-
tion was abolished in the case of dismissals "for economic reasons" 269 in
Max Schanzenbach, Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firing Costs or Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?,
5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 470, 470 (2003); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Die Kundigung, Licenciement, Recesso dal
Contrato, 'Firing', or 'Sacking': Comparing European and American Laws on Management Prerogatives and Dis-
cretion in Termination Decisions, 18 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 86 (2008) (both describing U.S.
employment law as an outlier compared to other industrialized countries).
260. See, e.g., David H. Autor, William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, Does Employment Protection
Reduce Productivity? Evidence from US States, 117 ECON. J. F189, F191-F194 (2003).
261. Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At- Will, 36 LABOR L.J. 557, 558 (1989).
262. William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L.
REV. 201, 204 (1985); Cindy Barber, Note: Comparison of International and U.S. Employment Termination
Procedures: How Far Have We Come?-A Step in the Right Direction, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L & COM. L. 165,
165 (1993); INTERNATIONAl LABOR ORGANIZATION, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT DIGEST 356 n.2
(2000).
263. Kindigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] § 1 (1), § 23 (1) (Legal protection against dismissal applying
only to firms with more than ten employees). The threshold was subject to some legislative variations
during the past years. The number was increased from 5 to 10 for employees who started to work after
Dec. 31, 2003. See Horst Weigand, § 23 KSchG, cmts. 33-33f, in GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR ZUM
KUNDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ UND ZU SONSTIGEN KNDIGUNGSSCHUTZRECHTLICHEN VORSCHRIFTEN (Pe-
ter Bader et al., 2007).
264. See Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Supreme Labor Court] Sept. 27, 1984, 2 AZR 62/83 (F.R.G.)
(finding an offer to move an employee to another department must take precedence over an outright
termination).
265. JEAN PELISSIER, ALAIN SuPioT & ANTOINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 457 (20th ed. 2000).
266. Roland Voize-Valayre, The French Law of Unjust Dismissals, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POt. 519,
523 (1991).
267. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAY.) art. L.122-14-3 (Fr.); see PELISSIER ET AL., supra note 265 at 454.
268. C. TRAV. art. L.122-14 (Fr.) (Failure to comply with the procedures may result in damages). See
also C. TRAV art. L.122-14-4 (Fr.).
269. C. TRAY. art. L.321-1 (Fr.) (The definition also includes substantial modifications of the contract
of employment); see Ordinance No. 45-1030 of May 24, 1945, Journal Officiel de la Rlpublique Fran-
gaise U.0.] [Official Gazette of France], May 25, 1945, p. 2970; Decree No. 45-1891 of August 23,
1945, J.O., Aug. 24, 1945, p. 5298; Injunction of October 6, 1945, J.O., Oct. 7, 1945, p. 6335 (The
requirement was incorporated into the Code du Travail by the Loi du 3 janv. 1975); see also FRANCK
MODERNE, LE CONTROLE ADMINISTRATIF DES LICENCIEMENTS ECONOMIQUES 16 (1983).
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1986,270 but the role of the works council (comiti d'entreprise) was strength-
ened. 271 Larger employers may even be required to select employees accord-
ing to "social" criteria. 27 2
More importantly for holdup issues, large operative reorganizations that
result in the redundancy of more than twenty (Germany) or ten (France)
employees trigger the duty to provide a "social plan" for employees that has
to be agreed upon with the works council. 273 Such a plan is costly for the
employer and typically includes severance payments or the creation of a trust
fund for employees failing to find subsequent employment. 27 4 French case
law states that employers have to take all possible measures within the
means of the firm to continue to employ the employees or to facilitate their
reassignment to another job.275
Employment protection law in other Continental European countries re-
sembles the situation in Germany and France. The combination of procedu-
ral hassle, employment protection, and social plans deters dismissals. For
example, a survey among German firms found that seventy-six percent of
firms had had difficulty pursuing dismissals "for compelling operational
reasons" in the past, often due to the standard of proof demanded by the
courts to establish operational reasons, or the difficulty of correctly applying
the social criteria of selecting employees for dismissal.2 7 6 Lawsuits are preva-
lent; studies covering the periods of September 1999 to November 2000 and
the years 1998 to 2003 concluded that lawsuits were brought in 11.1% and
15.3% of dismissals, respectively. 277 There are slightly lower numbers for
270. Law No. 86-797 of July 3, 1986, J.O., Jul. 4, 1986, p. 8302; Law No. 86-1320 of December 30,
1986, J.O., Dec. 31, 1986, p. 15888.
271. See JEAN-EMMANUEL RAY, DROIT Du TRAVAIL DROIT VIVANT 229 (9th ed. 2000).
272. C. TRAy. art. L.321-1-I (Fr.). But see GEORGES RiPERT, ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU CAPITALISME
MODERNE 296-300 (1946) (arguing that these acquire a property right comparable to that of an owner
by contributing to the firm due to the requirement to indemnify dismissed employees).
273. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Labor Relations Act], Jan. 15, 1972, BGBI. I at 2518,
§ 112 (F.R.G.). A notable decision of the federal labor court in 1979 explicitly stated that mere reduc-
tions of personnel also required social plans. Bundesarbeirsgericht [BAG] [Supreme Labor Court] May
22, 1979, 33 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 83 (1980) (F.R.G.); C. TRAV art. L.321-4-1 (Fr.).
Originally, the provision was not part of the law, but a national collective bargaining agreement (accord
national interprofessionne/ du 21 novembre 1974). See Gerard Couturier, Le plan social: aspects juridiques, 7-8
DROIT SOCIAL 643, 643 (1985). The social law became part of the labor code only in 1986 (Law No. 86-
1320 of December 30, 1986, J.O., Dec. 31, 1986, p. 15888. Amended by Law No. 89-549 of August 2,
1989, J.O., Aug. 8, 1989, p. 9954; Law No. 93-121 of January 27, 1993, J.O., Apr. 23, 1993, p. 1576).
274. See Harald Hess, § 112, cmt. 61, in KOMMENTAR ZUM BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ (Harald
Hess et al., 7th ed. 2008). BetrVG § 112a sets out minimum thresholds of affected employees. A study
covering the early 1980s found that social plans were often very costly, with payments exceeding fourteen
percent of annual profits and seven percent of equity for half of the firms. See EDMUND HEMMER, SOZIAL-
PLANPRAXIS IN DER BUNDESREPUBUK 43, 66, 78 (1988).
275. See PELISSIER ET AL., supra note 265, at 500-01.
276. Heide Pfarr, Silke Bothfeld, Lutz C. Kaiser, Martin Kimmich, Andreas Peuker & Karen Ull-
mann, REGAM-Studie: Die Kilndigungs-, Klage- und Abfindungspraxis in den Betrieben, 59 BETRIEBS-BER-
ATER 106, 109-10 (2004).
277. Id. at 106.
2009 / The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence
dismissals "for compelling operational reasons," with estimates ranging be-
tween eight percent and ten percent 8.2 7
The effect of these mechanisms is twofold. First, judicial review of dismis-
sal decisions, severance payments, and procedural hurdles all make dismissal
more costly to employers and hence reduce the credibility of a holdup
threat.2 7 9 Second, explicit and implicit costs borne by the employer, such as
payments resulting from a social plan, can be interpreted as a mechanism to
internalize the harm incurred by employees with shareholders as a result of a
dismissal, since the result is that there will only be an incentive to close a
plant if the gain to shareholders exceeds compensating payments. 280 Some of
the labor economics literature suggests that rules making dismissals more
expensive, such as severance payments, are associated with greater incentives
to invest in specific human capital.281 While these legal mechanisms may be
responsible for inflexibility in the labor market, they have the upside of
protecting employees' specific investment against holdup. To be sure, indi-
vidual and collective protection by law is not the only relevant factor. Collec-
tive bargaining agreements may have similar effects, and unions may help
workers to police implicit commitments by firms.28 2 However, the bargain-
ing power of unions may be greater in the shadow of a more worker-friendly
law.
B. Why Mandatory Law May Be Needed
A possible objection to the interpretation of pro-labor laws as facilitating
specific investment is that they are mandatory across the board. Detractors
have pointed out that adequate protection could be provided voluntarily by
stipulating employment protection in the work contract or codetermination
in the corporate charter. 28 3 Whereas voluntary codetermination is observed
only rarely in practice, individual employment contracts occasionally pro-
278. Harald Bielinski, Josef Hartmann, Heide Pfarr & Hartmut Seifert, Die Beendigung von Arbeit-
sverhdltnissen: Wahrnehmung und Wirklichkeit, 51 ARBEIT UND RECHT 81, 87 (2003) (estimating eight
percent); Pfarr et al., supra note 276, at 108 (estimating ten percent).
279. See Eger, supra note 38, at 387.
280. Engert, supra note 54, at 109; regarding the United Kingdom, see John Armour & Simon
Deakin, Insolvency and Employment Protection: the Mixed Effects of the Acquired Rights Directive, 22 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 443, 445-46 (2003).
281. Alison Booth & Monojit Chatterji, Redundancy Payments and Firm-specific Training, 56
ECONOMiCA 505 (1989); Alison L. Booth & Gylfi Zoega, On the Welfare Implications of Firing Costs, 19
EUR. J. POL ECON. 759 (2003); Susan N. Houseman, The Equity and Efficiency of Job Security: Contrasting
Perspectives on Collective Dismissal Laws in Western Europe, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LABOR MARKET
185, 187-88 (Katharine G. Abraham & Robert B. McKersie eds., 1990); Jens Suedekum & Peter
Ruehman, Severance Payments and Firm-Specific Human Capital, 17 LAB. 47 (2003).
282. See Chad Hogan, Enforcement of Implicit Employment Contracts Through Unionization, 19 J. LAB.
ECON. 171 (2001).
283. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 956-57 (1984)
(suggesting that parties to an employment contract "as a general matter know how to govern their own
lives"); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to
Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469, 472-75 (1979) (arguing that the burden of
proof as to why mandatory labor laws are required lies with the proponents of codetermination).
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vide some direct protection against dismissal-such as in the case of tenure
for university professors-or severance payments that internalize some of the
harm inflicted on the dismissed employee with the firm by making dismis-
sal more costly. 28 4 There are two responses to this objection.
First, there are a number of arguments why pro-labor laws should be
mandatory. Adverse selection is probably the argument most frequently
cited. Fauver and Fuerst suggest that for a single firm introducing
codetermination voluntarily, the increased bargaining power of workers
would reduce the wage differential between senior management and work-
ers, while job security would be strengthened. Thus, the firm would risk
losing the best managerial talent to competitors and attracting the least
productive workers with the strongest preference for job security. 285 Simi-
larly, it is often suggested that firms offering generous redundancy entitle-
ments within an environment without employment protection may attract
poor employees; for an employee, it may be irrational to bargain for job
protection as it may signal the absence of a commitment to work hard. 28 6
Armour and Deakin further suggest that the appropriate matching of indi-
vidual redundancy entitlements may be excessively costly to contract for,
both because of the difficulty in specifying outputs in individual states of
the world and because specific investment is hard to observe. 287 While any
job protection law is less tailored to the individual situation than a private
contract, the point is that such laws increase workers' bargaining power,
particularly on the collective level. 288
Sunstein also points out that successful bargaining for employment pro-
tection may be ruled out by an endowment effect, that is, the existence of a
difference between the amount someone is willing to pay for a right she does
not possess and the amount for which she would sell it if she does. 289 By
extension, a crude "sense of entitlement" similar to the one associated with
endowment effects may make the voluntary provision of codetermination
difficult, as it would be hard to "sell" a codetermination scheme to inves-
284. See, e.g., Verkerke, supra note 258, at 867 (reporting empirical findings on the prevalence of
employment-at-will and voluntary restrictions of dismissals to "just cause").
285. Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 37, at 679.
286. David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Adverse Worker Selection, 9 J. LAB.
ECON. 294 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law ofWork, 87 VA. L. REv. 205, 225-26
(2001); see also Armour & Deakin, supra note 280, at 447-48. But see Verkerke, supra note 258, at
902-05.
287. Armour & Deakin, supra note 280, at 447-48; see also Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Share-
holders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors, 10 J. MGMT. & Gov. 325, 328 (2006) (pointing out
the high transaction cost of protecting specific investment by contract).
288. Collective bargaining agreements may facilitate overcoming these problems; for example, an
industry-wide agreement with a union could eliminate the adverse selection problem. On the related
possibility of unions policing implicit commitments by firms to workers, see Hogan, supra note 282.
289. Sunstein, supra note 286, at 220-24. On the endowment effect, see generally Daniel Kahneman,
Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests ofthe Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1 ENcYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW AND ECONoMics 790, 804-06 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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tors. While the "traditional" justification of shareholder primacy resting on
shareholder ownership 290 of the firm has become obsolete in academic circles
with the development of the contractarian model, it is still preeminent in
the public consciousness. As "natural" owners of the firm, investors may feel
entitled to control its governance structure and hence be unwilling to partly
cede control, 291 even if the actual influence of small shareholders is ruled out
by the presence of a controlling shareholder. Benefits that are hard to de-
scribe in terms of financial figures may not be understood by investors. 292
According to a related behavioral explanation, employer representatives may
fear an increased sense of entitlement among workers due to job protection
laws, which may affect what bargains employees consider as fair, thus hurt-
ing the employer's bargaining position. 293
On top of that, codetermination and other pro-labor mechanisms often
work on the collective level. In other words, they are not individual workers'
rights that could be stipulated in individual employment contracts. It is
true that, to some extent, firms could enter into collective agreements with
unions. However, in order to formally involve employee representatives on
the level of corporate law, as codetermination does, any agreement would
have to be implemented in the corporate charter, which shareholders cannot
commit to refrain from amending at a later time.
The second response to the objection to mandatory law is that rules that
are intended to be mandatory may not always be binding in practice and are
effectively default rules for at least some employees. For example, mandatory
severance payments sometimes have the effect of turning full-time jobs into
part-time employment-where the law is less strict-resulting in an out-
sourcing of work to atypical employment relationships. 294 Low skilled work-
ers are more frequently affected by this phenomenon, 295 which may imply
that employers are in fact able to differentiate between workers where some
employment protection is desirable. Even German codetermination has al-
ways been non-mandatory to the extent that shareholders may decide to
break up a large firm into smaller, non-affiliated ones, which are subject to a
290. E.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, THE NEW YORK
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
291. But see Margaret M. Blair, Corporate "Ownership", 13 BROOKINGs REV. 16 (1995) (criticizing the
concept of "ownership" of the firm as misleading and a reason for distortions in corporate law policy
debates).
292. Frick et al., supra note 33, at 751-53.
293. Houseman, supra note 281, at 191-92.
294. Edward P. LazearJob Security Provisions and Employment, 105 Q.J. ECON. 699, 724-25 (1990); see
also David H. Autor, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of
Employment Outsourcing, 21 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (2003) (arguing that increased firing costs lead to increased
outsourcing).
295. See, e.g., Bernhard Boockmann & Tobias Hagen, The Use of Flexible Working Contracts in West
Germany: Evidence from an Establishment Panel 9-10 (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No.
01-33, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=358341 (finding that temporarily employed workers
have comparatively less education).
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less stringent employee participation regime. 296 To the extent that such pos-
sibilities exist, mandatory law effectively becomes default law, which seems
to be as efficient as transaction-cost-saving standard rules in a system with
strong shareholder influence.
Taking these two responses together, the prevalence of mandatory law
does not undermine the theory advanced in this Article.
V. RE-INTERPRETING COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
In this Section, I draw together the elements presented above-different
degrees of shareholder influence and stakeholder protection laws in the
United States and Continental Europe-into a unifying theory. First, I sug-
gest that the two combinations may constitute different local optima from a
normative perspective (Part A). I then briefly discuss the chronology of their
development, which suggests that employment legislation was preceded by
strong shareholder influence (Part B), and briefly discuss potential conse-
quences for the future (Part C).
A. Two Local Optima
We have seen that U.S. corporate governance provides relatively little
explicit or implicit shareholder influence, despite pervasive rhetoric about
shareholder primacy. In contrast, Continental laws like those of France and
Germany are usually said to have a broader corporate objective and a dearth
of shareholder primacy. However, the prevailing concentrated ownership
structure creates a considerable degree of explicit shareholder influence,
which exacerbates holdup risk for other groups. Even though German corpo-
rate law does not provide for strong shareholder influence, in contrast to
French or Italian law, the explicit influence of large shareholders in German
corporate governance renders the law on the books irrelevant in that re-
spect. 297 Apart from the United States, the laws of these states have other
296. However, such split-ups may result in considerable costs. See Gorton & Schmid, supra note 253,
at 895. In recent years, the possibility of forming a European Company (SE) or merging companies from
different Member States has created some possibilities of reducing the influence of employees in German
firms. Both the creation of an SE and a cross-border merger trigger a negotiation process about the future
employee participation regime, in which employees are in a strong bargaining position. See Andrew
Johnston, EC Freedom of Establishment, Employee Participation in Corporate Governance and the Limits of Regu-
latory Competition, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 71, 109 (2006). However, an SE can be merged into a national
legal form without any employee participation after two years. Council Regulation 2157/2001, art. 66.1,
2001 O.J. (L 294) 1, 17 (EC). Council directive 2005/56, art. 16.7, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1, 8 (EC) requires
Member States to protect employee participation rights in the event of subsequent domestic mergers for
a period of three years. Some authors are therefore speaking of an "erosion" of codetermination. See
Mathias Habersack, Grundsatzfragen der Mitbestimmung in SE and SCE sowie bei grenz'berschreitender
Verschmelzung, 171 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 613, 643
(2007).
297. See Zetzsche, supra note 79.
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mechanisms to compensate for this, such as tightly-knit rules designed to
protect employees.
In the U.S. context, Lucian Bebchuk criticizes team production theory,298
and more generally claims that stakeholder holdup problems are mitigated
by mechanisms curbing the influence of dispersed shareholders. Bebchuk
points out that if this were a real concern, analysts supporting limitations on
the power of dispersed shareholders would also have to "support limiting
the intervention power of controlling shareholders." 299 The comparative dis-
cussion in the preceding section confirms this prediction: mechanisms pro-
tecting employees against shareholder intervention are comparatively weaker
in the United States than in Continental European countries. No aspect of a
corporate governance system will be optimal for each and every individual
firm. We observe both public firms with core shareholders in countries oth-
erwise dominated by dispersed ownership and widely-held firms in countries
with mostly concentrated ownership. 00 However, since concentrated owner-
ship is much more prevalent in Continental Europe than in the United
States, my analysis suggests that, all else being equal, stronger protection of
stakeholders will have stronger benefits in these countries.
In fact, both U.S. and the prototypical Continental European corporate
governance systems, without being perfect, may be close to equilibrium.
This assumes that there are two options regarding shareholder influence
("strong" and "weak" shareholders) and two options regarding the protec-
tion of employees against opportunism by or on behalf of shareholders
("strong" and "weak" stakeholders). The possible combinations are shown
in Table 1. Among these four options, there are only two local optima.
Deviations on one axis, therefore, will be suboptimal for a corporate govern-
ance system.
A weak shareholders B strong shareholders
weak stakeholders weak stakeholders
C weak shareholders D strong stakeholders
strong stakeholders strong shareholders
Table 1: Local optima of shareholder influence and stakeholder
protection
A and D are local optima. Each of A and D outperforms B and C. The
United States is near point A; Continental European corporate governance
systems such as France and Germany may be near D. Corporate governance
298. See generally Part II.B.
299. Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 909.
300. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 1657-60.
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systems may be ill-advised to move out of the local optima of A and D along
the vertical axis. Regarding the relationship between firms and their em-
ployees, there are two types of costs to consider. Most of all, this article has
been concerned with holdup cost, which increases with the degree of share-
holder influence. The "strong stakeholders" option may mitigate it, but
that choice is not without cost. German codetermination, for example, is
often criticized on the grounds that it is detrimental to an efficient function-
ing of the board, because the board of directors grows in size and a diversity
of interests among heterogeneous groups hampers decision making.3 "
Strong employment protection is a crude and costly instrument, as it
heightens the bargaining power not only of "deserving" employees making
valuable specific investment, but also of employees with low productivity,
who may be the first to lose their jobs in times of crisis and who should be
the first to be dismissed if the overarching goal is the total welfare of all
corporate constituencies.1 2
The labor economics literature emphasizes how employment protection
laws and mandatory severance payments may make it difficult for firms to
adjust to modified circumstances. 303 In a "strong shareholders" environ-
ment, these costs will typically be outweighed by the benefits of reduced
holdup risk, which is why D will be preferable to B. By contrast, for a
corporate governance system starting out in a "weak shareholders" world, a"strong stakeholders" strategy would be excessive, as there is little to gain
on the holdup front, while the strategy's intrinsic costs are still present,
which is why A will outperform C.
It is easy to make a parallel argument on the political level to explain why
either A or D can be stable against moves along the vertical axis-that is,
against changes in the strength of pro-employee laws. Once human capital
investments have been made, employees have a strong incentive to lobby
against the abolition of such laws, given the large potential for holdup,
which should be smaller under dispersed ownership. Furthermore, once the
system is in place it is doubtful whether the incentives of the representatives
of "business interests" to lobby for the abolition of pro-employee laws are
particularly strong, since making holdup more difficult may be mutually
beneficial. True, large shareholders' incentive to "exploit" employees may
translate to the political level, particularly in firms where overall welfare is
increased by pro-stakeholder laws, but shareholder wealth is decreased.
However, in other cases pro-stakeholder laws tying the blockholders' hands
will be mutually beneficial, as they allow commitment to avoid holdup.
This may mitigate the overall incentive to lobby against them. Pro-stake-
301. E.g., Pistor, supra note 246, at 178-79. But see HANSMANN, supra note 37, at 110-12.
302. See Suedekum & Ruehmann, supra note 281, at 59 (stating that mandatory severance payments
may create both incentive effects and lethargy effects).
303. See, e.g., Lazear, supra note 294; John T. Addison & Paulino Texeira, The Economics of Employment
Protection, 24 J. LAB. REs. 85, 107-15 (2003); David H. Autor, John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab,
The Costs of Wrong/ul-Discharge Laws, 88 Rev. EcoN. & STAT. 21 1 (2006).
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holder laws are precisely the reason why the structure is effective; without
them, controlling shareholders would have ample opportunities to exploit
stakeholders, thus destroying stakeholder incentives to make specific invest-
ments. Pro-stakeholder laws substitute the commitment not to exploit
stakeholders that controlling shareholders are otherwise unable to provide.
Thus far, this Article has generally accepted concentrated or dispersed
ownership as unavoidable. Many comparative corporate governance theories
try to explain why dispersed or concentrated ownership persists in a particu-
lar country. This Article's argument is not incompatible with theories on
differences in ownership concentration, but instead demonstrates how these
differences interact with managerial autonomy. To complete the analysis of
the local optimality of points A and D in Table 1, first consider the persis-
tence of a concentrated ownership structure, or the domination of D over C.
The predominant theory of the persistence of concentrated ownership is the
"law matters" thesis, according to which large ownership blocks serve as a
substitute for adequate legal protection of shareholders. 3 4 The theory states
that good corporate law, or, failing that, monitoring by large shareholders,
can hold the private benefits of control and self-dealing by managers in
check. However, the presence of a large shareholder creates other problems,
especially those associated with private benefits. 05 "Law matters" can also
suggest that bad law inadequately protects the minority against large share-
holders, who therefore have an incentive to maintain their position despite
an inefficient allocation of risk.30 6 Increased holdup risk joins the ranks of
the vices of concentrated ownership.307 The "law matters" theory is inter-
twined with the "legal origins theory," according to which common law
legal systems are supposedly more protective of minority shareholders.30 8
Some scholars have argued that civil law systems are more protective of em-
ployees than common law systems.30 9 If it is true that common law systems
are inherently linked to dispersed ownership, the thesis of this Article pro-
vides a theoretical basis for a link to employment law. In addition, it does
304. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determi-
nants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. PoL.
ECON. 1113, 1145-51 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 647-48 (1999); Bernard S. Black, The
Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781, 834-35 (2001);
Cheffins, supra note 4, at 461-65.
305. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (NBER Work-
ing Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=203110.
306. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and Compara-
tive Corporate Governance, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 34-36 (2001); Gilson, supra note 3, at 1644, 1654.
307. Failing legal protection, the possibility of holding up stakeholders might create an additional
incentive not to sell the controlling block on the market and allow ownership to disperse.
308. La Porta et al., supra note 304; Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,
58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might
Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2003).
309. See Botero et al., supra note 257 (finding that labor markets are more regulated in civil law
countries than in common law countries); Pagano & Volpin, supra note 17, at 1024 (table showing the
statistical significance of legal origins for employment protection).
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not need to refer to common law and civil law as proxies for different ap-
proaches to government regulation of markets, with "civil law" standing for
a greater degree of state intervention to achieve goals of social justice and
common law for the protection of property rights.3 10
If corporate law in Continental Europe and elsewhere is indeed moving
toward a better protection of minority shareholders, 31' the "law matters"
theory would predict more ownership dispersion. In the framework of this
section, the consequence would be reduced shareholder influence, which
would facilitate an incremental reduction of pro-stakeholder laws. However,
there are a number of countervailing factors, in particular the possible devel-
opment of implicit shareholder influence, as we have seen in the United
Kingdom. 312
As an alternative to the "law matters" thesis, one could use Roe's politi-
cal theory to explain why horizontal moves from D to C are difficult. Roe
argues that pro-stakeholder laws such as codetermination or employment
protection are the consequences of exogenous political factors to which he
applies the label "social democracy." 313 Roe also suggests that the ultimate
reason for the prevalence of social democracy may be the history of war and
turmoil during the first half of the twentieth century in the core civil law
countries. 314 In a country with strong stakeholders, pro-stakeholder laws
help managers to pursue their own goals to the detriment of stockholders.
Providers of capital are thus likely to congregate to amass large ownership
stakes in order to improve monitoring of managers.3 15 D will therefore result
in more competitive firms than C. Combining Roe's theory and that of this
Article may help to explain why strong shareholder influence and strong
stakeholder influence are complementary factors that reinforce each other, as
suggested by Roe. This may be the reason why we are not seeing a rapid
move to an end of history for corporate governance, leaving only the U.S.
model, 316 but-for the time being-the persistence of differences.
Part A of Table 1, which corresponds to the situation in the United
States, should normatively dominate B, where weakly protected stakeholders
face strong shareholder influence. Concentrated ownership systems are asso-
ciated with a loss of liquidity and greater difficulty in tapping capital mar-
310. See La Porta et al., supra note 256 (giving a unified interpretation of various results of legal
origins in different fields); Thorsten Beck, Ash Demirgi0g-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why
Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653, 657-58 (2003).
311. E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 442, 453.
312. See infra Part VI.
313. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
314. See generally Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARv. L. REv. 462
(2006); Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Political Instability's Impact on Financial Development (Harvard Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 08-29, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963214.
315. Roe, supra note 12, at 544-60; ROE, POUTICAL DETs-sssINANTS, supra note 17, at 35-36.
316. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5.
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kets for additional finance.3 17 At the level of individual firms, a move from
A to B corresponds to the "breach of trust" situation described by Coffee,
Shleifer, and Summers.3 8 While the "discovery" of financing a hostile take-
over with high-yield debt greatly facilitated or even allowed the takeover
wave of the 1980S, 319 the development of the case law up to the mid-1990s
ultimately brought U.S. corporate governance back closer to A.3 20 As de-
scribed above, due to the limits on takeovers, it is once again relatively hard
for shareholders of individual firms to opt out of A once ownership has be-
come dispersed.3 2' At the level of the corporate governance system as a
whole, my theory adds the potential augmentation of holdup risks to the
other vices of concentrated ownership. For this reason, a move from A to B
should not be beneficial unless any increase of shareholder influence is ac-
companied by a strengthening of pro-stakeholder laws.3 22 Furthermore, ex-
cessive implicit shareholder influence in the form of an executive-pay-
induced shareholder value maximization norm has often been blamed for
recent corporate scandals.3 23 Such occurrences may well result in an elimina-
tion of firms diverging from point A and possibly in a backlash on the level
of both politics and social norms.
B. The Chronology: Ownership Structure Before Pro-Stakeholder Laws
The question remains whether the enactment of pro-stakeholder laws pre-
ceded or followed shareholder influence. While the analysis of this Article
focuses the former, Roe emphasizes the causal connection running from pro-
employee laws to concentrated ownership (without ruling out a connection
between the two in both directions). He suggests that employee power, as a
consequence of certain political preconditions in a given country, impedes
the development of dispersed ownership, since ownership concentration is
needed to provide increased monitoring in view of the agency costs exacer-
317. Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corpo-
rate Ownership Structure, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 177, 177 (1998); Bratton & Mc-
Cahery, supra note 306, at 12.
318. Coffee, supra note 44, at 70-71; Shleifer & Summers, supra note 56.
319. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 111-30 (2005); Armour & Skeel, supra note 134, at
1755.
320. The disappearance of the edge in shareholder value (measured in Tobin's Q) that Delaware cor-
porations had over firms incorporated elsewhere in the mid-1990s has been attributed to the Delaware
case law, including the Unitrin case, supra note 118. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware
Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 52-54 (2004).
321. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
322. On the political level, the weak position of shareholders in the United States is entrenched by
the lobbying of other groups. The antitakeover statutes of the 1980s were typically promoted by a broad
coalition of interests, including managers and labor. See Romano, supra note 155, at 120-28. The SEC's
2003 shareholder access proposal, which might have facilitated a limited degree of explicit shareholder
influence, was successfully opposed by the Business Roundtable. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2522-23 (2005).
323. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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bated by stakeholder influence.3 24 However, the two theories may be com-
patible. Roe acknowledges that blockholding predated German
codetermination.32 5 In addition, he argues that focusing on the historical
sequence misses the point because German block ownership and
codetermination are two complementary institutions, each of which calls
forth the other. Thus, it is difficult to change one without changing the
other.126
In fact, as concentrated ownership is the international norm and dispersed
ownership the exception, one could speak of concentrated ownership as the
primeval state of any corporate governance system. 32 7 Newly created firms
are invariably privately held at their beginnings, and only by growing and
tapping the stock exchanges can they develop into Berle-Means style corpo-
rations. Thus, it is not the persistence of concentrated ownership, but rather
its unraveling in the United States and the United Kingdom that calls for
an explanation.3 2 8 In Germany, despite a trend toward concentration of firms
and increased ownership dispersion, the majority of large enterprises have
remained under the control of small groups of owners who make strategic
decisions.3 29 While a minority of manager-controlled firms established itself
in the 1920s, 330 any nascent movement toward dispersed ownership had
come to a halt by the years after World War II, when private households
exited the stock markets. 331 Similarly, France may have been on its way to a
corporate governance system characterized by strong equity markets and dis-
persed ownership before World War I, but "this flirtation [with the stock
market], unlike the love affair in the United States and the United King-
dom, did not persist through the twentieth century." 332 Thus, shareholder
324. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
325. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 17, at 17-18.
326. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 17, at 78. But see Holger M. Mueller & Thomas
Philippon, Concentrated Ownership and Labor Relations (Centre for Econ. Pol'y, Discussion Paper No. 5776,
July 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933094 (suggesting hostile labor relations as the proxi-
mate cause for concentrated ownership, without ruling out a feedback loop between the two). However,
hostile labor relations could well be an alternative consequence of concentrated ownership.
327. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
328. There is extensive literature seeking to explain why the United States and the United Kingdom
have developed dispersed ownership structures (and developed securities markets) while most other coun-
tries have not. The "law matters" theory is probably the most widely accepted. Its adherents argue that
good corporate law protecting shareholders against managerial misconduct (and, at the same time,
against misconduct by large blockholders) allows the unraveling of large ownership blocks and the devel-
opment of a dispersed ownership structure. See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text. The leading
contender is Mark Roe's political theory, according to which, regulation of financial institutions in the
United States has inhibited the activities of large blockholders, whereas in Continental Europe, pro-labor
laws have solidified the presence of blockholders to balance labor power. See supra notes 314-15 and
accompanying text.
329. Caroline Fohlin, The History of Ownership and Control in Germany, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 223, 227-33 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2005).
330. Id. at 229.
331. Id. at 231-32.
332. Murphy, supra note 237, at 203 (referring to the data compiled by Rajan & Zingales, according
to whom France had one of the highest ratios of total market capitalization to GDP in 1913, but only a
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influence not only came before codetermination, but also before employment
law and other pro-stakeholder mechanisms in Europe. Pro-stakeholder legis-
lation in Continental Europe often followed a period of labor conflict and/or
political instability. Earlier precursors to codetermination and employment
protection were passed in Germany shortly after World War I.3 Contem-
porary employment protection law has its roots in the years after World
War 11.334 Codetermination was expanded most recently in 1976, following
a period of labor strikes in the early 1970s.335 The French and Italian em-
ployment laws that characterize their respective labor markets today were
passed in that period as well.33 6
This chronology does not imply that holdup problems were the only fac-
tor or proximate cause for pro-employee laws. Political results are the conse-
quence of complex social and historical developments. Roe points out that
certain structures of production may not be politically stable and therefore
may have induced social democratic policies, such as codetermination, whose
purpose was to rein in bankers and industrialists. 3 7 At times, legislation
making important changes must overcome serious obstacles, but crises and
the discreditation of elites-as in the case of post-war legislation in Ger-
many-may serve as a catalyst. Persistent strikes and social unrest that have
often contributed to the passing of pro-stakeholder laws can be interpreted
as a symptom of imbalance in corporate governance systems.
At the time pro-employee laws surfaced for the first time in Germany in
the 1920s, dispersed ownership was already predominant in the United
States due to the development of the large railroads in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century338 and the merger wave of the 1890s and early 1900s.139
comparatively small one in later decades); see Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals:
The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 15 (2003); see also Leslie
Hannah, The 'Divorce' of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-calibrating Imagined Global Trends,
49 Bus. HIST. 404, 406 (2007) (comparing the relative sizes of the New York, London, Paris, and Berlin
stock markets in 1900).
333. Betriebsrdtegesetz [Labor Representative Law] 1920, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] § 147 (introduc-
ing works councils); Gesetz fiber die Entsendung von Betriebsratsmitgliedern in den Aufsichtsrat [Labor
Representative Appointment Law) 1922, RGBI § 209 (introducing employee representatives on the su-
pervisory board for the first time); see Thomas Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 36 Am. J. COMp. L. 111, 117-18 (1988); ROE, supra note 115, at 213; Raiser, supra note 249,
at B 11. A 1920 law first allowed employees to challenge "socially unacceptable" dismissals in court if
the works council supported their complaint. See Stefan Fiebig, Einleitung, cmt. 104, in KUNDIGUNGSS-
CHUTZGESETZ HANDKOMMENTAR (Stefan Fiebig et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).
334. The Kiendigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG) was passed in 1951 to reunify laws in the Western zones. See
Fiebig, supra note 333, cmts. 108-13; see also 4 RECHT DER ARBEiT 61-63 (1951) (the official proposal).
335. RoE, supra note 115, at 213.
336. Regarding France, see supra note 266 and accompanying text; Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor
Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 398-404 (1990).
337. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 17, at 112-13; see also Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998).
338. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 24-26; BERLE & MEANS, supra note 22, at 13; ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 87 (1977).
339. SKEEL, supra note 319, at 59-62; Coffee, supra note 4, at 33. See generally CHANDLER, supra note
338, at 331 (background information discussing the political and legal reasons for mergers); NAOMI
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By the time Berle and Means published their famous book in 1932, dis-
persed ownership was prevalent,3 40 and stock ownership had become com-
mon in the middle class.3 41 As a result, managerial power and the
atomization of shareholders became the paradigmatic image of the large U.S.
firm . 42 The political reaction to the Great Depression included reforms that
further strengthened the entrenchment of managers and shielded them
against shareholder influence, particularly by further stymieing the growth
of financial institutions that might have become important large sharehold-
ers as they did elsewhere.3 43 Pro-stakeholder legislation remained relatively
rare. True, the Depression-era Wagner Act strengthened the position of un-
ions, 344 but its pro-labor effects were greatly mitigated after little more than
a decade by the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947.1 4, While antitakeover
statutes that also had the effect of shielding managers passed, pro-labor leg-
islation rarely made it to the legislative drawing board . 46 Still, the United
States has enjoyed stable labor relations during most of the twentieth
century.
C. The Future: Path Dependence and Continental European
Corporate Governance Reforms
The world keeps turning, and both the law and corporate governance
structures change. Like most comparative corporate governance theories, my
basic thesis may be better at explaining corporate governance structures
around 1990 than the trends of the late 1990s and 2000s and future devel-
opments. In the United States, prominent commentators have identified a
decline in the managerialist view of the firm, with some of the contributing
LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904, at 1-2 (1985) (pro-
viding historical data regarding the number of consolidations that occurred during the merger
movement).
340. See Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in American Industry, 46 Q.J. ECON.
68, 94 (1931) (summarizing the data); see also BERLE & MEANS, sapra note 22, at 47-68; CHANDLER,
supra note 338, at 451 (describing an increasing distinction between ownership and control in the
1910s); ALERED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 85, 191
(1990); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder
Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1361 (2006) ("[Bly the second decade of the twentieth
century, the plutocratic corporation ... was already being transformed into the 'modern' corporation that
Berle and Means would put in the spotlight of their 1932 book.").
341. See generally Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.J. ECON.
561 (1930).
342. ROE, supra note 115, at 6.
343. Id at 95-101.
344. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 499 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1998)).
345. 61 Stat. 135 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1998)); see, e.g., WILLIAM B.
GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 31 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the impression that "the
pendulum had swung too far" in favor of labor between 1935 and 1947); ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 80-81 (14th ed. 2006) (describing concerns about excessive union power
before 1947).
346. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 336, at 392-96.
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factors being increased takeover activity since the 1980s and a move toward
greater emphasis on shareholder value. 347 Similarly, scholars have remarked
that core Continental European corporate governance systems, such as that
of Germany, may be moving closer to more dispersed ownership, suggested
by a moderate decrease of the median size of the largest voting block of
publicly traded firms between 1997 and 2001,348 while also sliding toward a
legal framework and economic structure that emphasizes the concerns of
dispersed investors to a stronger degree.3 49 At the same time, at least some
hostile takeovers, which are only possible in cases of relatively dispersed
ownership, began to emerge on the Continent, such as in the widely dis-
cussed takeover of the Mannesmann conglomerate by the British mobile
phone company Vodafone Airtouch PLC. 350 Concurrently, employment pro-
tection laws have been subject to increased scrutiny in recent years. Regula-
tory arbitrage possibilies created by E.U. law lead to the erosion of national
employee participation systems,35' while criticism of codetermination is on
the rise among German legal scholars.35 2
I have attempted to elucidate the interaction between shareholder influ-
ence and employee exposure to holdup. Changes with regard to this relation-
ship might be connected to the structure of production and the amount of
specific investment optimal under current circumstances; a decrease in the
protection of firm-specific investment might coincide with a change in pro-
duction technology or with a decline of traditional industries where such
investment by employees was important. Concurrently, the takeover wave of
347. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 444; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Indepen-
dent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465, 1510-35 (2007) (discussing the history and evolution of the corporate board during the
latter half of the twentieth century). Cf id. at 1514 n.187 (suggesting that Blair & Stout's team produc-
tion model may rather be a description of the role of the board of U.S. corporations in the 1950s).
348. W6jcik, supra note 201, at 1442-43. But see Sigurd Vitols, Changes in Germany's Bank-Based
Financial System: Implications for Corporate Governance, 13 CORP. Gov. 386 (2005) (suggesting that Ger-
many's finance system still remains largely bank-centered in spite of the reduction of banks' holdings in
publicly traded firms).
349. Cheffins, supra note 5, at 501-05; see John W. Cioffi, Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of
Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 L. & POLY 355 (2002); see also
Enriques & Volpin, supra note 208, at 131-34 (summarizing pro-shareholder reforms of the past 15 years
in France, Germany and Italy). But see Sigurd Vitols, Negotiated Shareholder Value: the German Variant ofan
Anglo-American Practice, 8 COMPETITION & CHANGE 357 (2004) (arguing that changes have been overesti-
mated and that institutional investors are merely being accepted as additional participants in the com-
promise between different groups).
350. For an account of the case and the litigation that ensued, see, Franklin A. Gevurtz, Disney in a
Comparative Light, 55 Am. J. COMP. L. 453, 459-62 (2007).
351. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Jean J. Du Plessis & Otto Sandrock, The Rise and Fall of Supervisory Codetermination in
Germany, 16 INT'L COMM. & Co. L. REV. 67, 74-76 (2005) (providing an overview of the critique and
evasion strategies by firms); Michael Adams, Das Ende der Mitbestimmung, 27 ZEITSCHRIFr FR WIRT-
SCHAFSRECHT (ZIP) 1561 (2006) (harshly criticizing codetermination). But see Christine Windbichler,
Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum, 6 EUR. Bus.
ORG. L. REV. 507 (2005).
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the 1980s may have left a lasting impression by teaching employees to avoid
specific investment and not allow themselves to be "cheated" again.
Still, I have highlighted institutional complementarities that may result
in path dependence. 5 3 In spite of the competitive pressures of a globalized
economy, past choices matter, and a convergence of corporate governance
structures is not inevitable. 35 4 While some path dependence theories focus
mostly on aspects of legal culture and the persistence of doctrinal categories,
the reason given here rests essentially on switching costs. 35 5 The combina-
tion of shareholder influence and employee protection is partly determined
by law and partly by empirical facts such as ownership concentration. As-
suming the availability of a stable amount of optimal specific investment,
changing either of these abruptly seems unwise. Abolishing strict employ-
ment protection law while concentrated ownership is still in place would
create considerable holdup costs. Changes with respect to both dimensions
may be difficult or costly, if not outright unfeasible in some circumstances.
For example, if we knew that the U.S.-style equilibrium A was superior to
Continental-style equilibrium D, it might be difficult to get there simply
by abolishing pro-employee laws, which might not be enough to induce the
development of dispersed ownership by itself. Dispersion may require a
combination of several factors that develop only over the course of several
decades. Reform-oriented scholars and policymakers should be aware of the
risks involved and take institutional complementarities seriously. However,
if ownership structures on the European continent are actually moving to-
ward less concentrated ownership, the rationale for pro-employee laws may
be subsiding. Reforms in employment law and reforms with respect to
codetermination should be incremental and should take the development of
ownership structures into account.
In the long run, product market competition resulting from the increased
openness of national economies to foreign trade may demonstrate which of
the two local optima is also optimal for the world as a whole. While there
may be no unique answer, it may turn out that one or the other is better
suited for particular industries.
VI. PUTTING THE UNITED KINGDOM BACK ON THE MAP
Although this Article has thus far focused on the contrast between the
United States and Continental Europe, the United Kingdom presents a pe-
353. For a general description in the context of the "varieties of capitalism" literature, see Hall &
Soskice, supra note 19, at 17-21.
354. See Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Compleonen-
tarity, 5 INT'L FIN. 311, 312-13 (2002); see also Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,
109 HRAv. L. REv. 641, 643-44 (1996).
355. See generally Schmidt & Spindler, supra note 354, at 314-15 (discussing the switching cost argu-
ment for path dependence).
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culiar case for comparative corporate governance theories.3 5 6 While scholars
dispute the exact time at which the corporate landscape of the United King-
dom came to be characterized by dispersed ownership, 357 the majority be-
lieve blockholders "unwound" at a later time than in the United States,
with dispersion only solidifying by the 1980s.35 8 While ownership disper-
sion is the norm in the United Kingdom, both explicit and implicit shareholder
influence are stronger there than in the United States.35 9 While the U.S. sys-
tem is characterized by little influence of either type, the United Kingdom
has partly replaced explicit shareholder influence with implicit influence.
First, the empirical evidence tells us that dispersion in the United King-
dom is actually less pronounced than in the United States. Individual blocks
are bigger, and about seventy percent of shares are in the hands of institu-
tional investors, as opposed to fifty percent in the United States.3 60 In 1994,
the five biggest investors typically owned more than thirty percent of shares
in smaller firms.3 61 Some researchers even expressed doubts that dispersed
ownership defined companies in the United Kingdom.3 62 Others argued that
that large British firms were not dominated by managers like a typical
Berle-Means firm, but were instead governed by "constellations of control-
ling interests" consisting of about twenty shareholders who jointly con-
trolled most listed corporations.3 63 The data of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny support this view, suggesting that most publicly traded
356. See Mark J. Roe, Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Control, in CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE REGIMES 113, 129-30 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002) (pointing out difficulties both
for the political- and law-based theories).
357. See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics and the UK's System of Corporate Governance: Lessons from
History, I J. CORP. L. STUD. 71, 82 (2001) (citing various authors giving dates ranging from the 1950s to
the 1980s).
358. See, e.g., id. But see Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on
the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 426 (2007) (identifying the merger wave of the 1960s as crucial
for dispersed ownership in Britain). Regarding the alternative thesis of Franks, Mayer and Rossi, see infra
notes 410-413 and accompanying text.
359. See Simon Deakin et al., Anglo-American Corporate Governance and the Employment Relationship: A
Case to Answer?, 4 Socio-ECON. REV. 155, 161 (2006); Jennifer Hill, The Shifting Balance of Power Between
Shareholders and the Board: News Corp's Exodus to Delaware and Other Antipodean Tales 14-16 (VAND. UNIV.
L. SCH., L. & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER No. 08-06, 2008), availahle a http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1086477
(tracing differences to the origins of U.K. and U.S. corporate law).
360. John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure and the
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699, 1750 (2002); see
Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regu-
lation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2002 (1994).
361. Black & Coffee, supra note 360, at 2002.
362. See G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 10 (1996)
(suggesting that truly dispersed ownership was not present in the majority of listed U.K. firms in the
early 1990s).
363. John Scott, Corporate Control and Corporate Rule: Britain in an International Perspective, 41 BRiT. J.
Soc. 351, 359-65 (1990). Perhaps more controversially, Scott makes the same claim for the United
States. Id. at 369-70; see also JOHN SCOTT, CORPORATE BUSINESS AND CAPITALIST CLASSES 92-93 (1997)
(making the same claim for both countries, while acknowledging that ownership dispersion is greater in
the United States than the United Kingdom).
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medium-sized British firms have at least one blockholder with at least ten
percent of shares.36
While classifying Britain as an outsider corporate governance country, 65
Armour, Cheffins, and Skeel point out that British securities law, quite con-
trary to the law in the United States, 366 does not impede the formation of
coalitions between institutional investors.3 67 Showing a certain "British re-
serve," investors sometimes exercise concerted influence when a firm is ex-
periencing difficulties. For example, they might require a restructuring of
management when new shares are issued.368 Comparing the United States
and the United Kingdom, Bebchuk observes that "[tihe corporate law sys-
tem of the United States is the one that stands out ... in how far it goes to
restrict shareholder initiative and intervention. '" 369
However, the more important factor is implicit shareholder influence. The
most conspicuous difference between the United States and the United
Kingdom in that respect is in takeover law, where the two countries are
situated at two opposing ends of the possible regulatory spectrum. In stark
contrast to the "just say no" defense available to U.S. directors,3 70 the Brit-
ish "City Code on Takeovers and Mergers" of 196971 binds the board to
strict neutrality regarding takeover bids. During the course of an offer, or
even when the board has reason to believe that a bona fide offer is imminent,
it may not "take any action which may result in any offer or bona fide
possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied the opportu-
nity to decide on its merits. '"372 There are rules that prevent poison pills and
similar defensive measures, 73 and the board is required to seek shareholder
approval if it wishes to enter into certain types of transactions that may
threaten the financial viability of a takeover.37 4
As a result, the discretion of U.K. boards to act against takeovers is much
more curtailed than that of their U.S. counterparts. Once a hostile bid ap-
pears on the radar screen, the only workable countermeasures are "defense
364. See La Porta et al., supra note 156, at 495.
365. Armour et al., supra note 360, at 1751-52.
366. See supra Part III.B.1.
367. Armour et al., supra note 360, at 1751-52.
368. Id. at 1751-52; Black & Coffee, supra note 360, at 2037, 2053; see STAPLEDON, supra note 362,
at 122-29.
369. Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 848-49 (referring to differences in shareholders' agenda-setting
power); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 100, at 46-47.
370. See supra Part III.B.1.
371. The City Code was enacted in 1968, but was preceded by the "Queensbury Rules of 1959."
BANK OF ENGLAND, NOTES ON THE AMALGAMATION OF BRITISH BUSINESSES (1959), cited in Armour &
Skeel, supra note 134, at 1759; see also Johnston, supra note 358, at 432-34.
372. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CIr CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, at R.
21.1(a) (8th ed. 2006). Before the 2006 amendments to the Code, this general clause was not part of Rule
21, but General Principle 7 of the Code. For a discussion of these amendments, see Geoffrey K. Morse,
Proposed Amendments to the Takeovers Code to Implement the 13th EC Directive, 2006 J. Bus. L. 242 (2006).
373. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, at R.
21.1.(b)(i)-(iii) (8th ed. 2006).
374. Id. at 21.1.(b)(iv)-(v).
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documents," such as strong public criticism of the price and terms of the
bid, or efforts to find an alternative transaction by bringing in a "white
knight" to defeat the hostile offer or management buyout.3 75 As Paul Davies
puts it, "the directors of the target are thrown back on their powers of
persuasion. "376 Empirical evidence suggests that the threat of a hostile take-
over looms more prominently over U.K. managers than over their U.S.
peers. While the U.S. economy is six times larger than the British economy,
only twice as many hostile takeovers occurred in the United States during
the 1990s. 3 77 More than eighty percent of takeovers in the United Kingdom
between 1990 and 2005 were hostile, as opposed to fifty-seven percent in
the United States. While forty-three percent of hostile takeovers were suc-
cessful in the United Kingdom, only twenty-four percent went through in
the United States, with the United Kingdom actually surpassing the United
States in the absolute number of successful bids.378 These numbers may even
underestimate the actual effect of U.S. antitakeover regulation and case law,
since they do not reflect those takeovers that were deterred in the first place.
Armour, Cheffins, and Skeel conclude that "the City Code sets up a regime
that focuses director attention in the conduct of a bid on the immediate
question whether it is in the shareholders' best interests to accept a tender
offer. "379
Takeovers are perhaps the most important situations that can result in a
holdup problem, 380 but they are only one part of the picture. Davies and
Hopt point out that this striking difference is not an idiosyncrasy of take-
over law, but rather the reflection of a different general attitude of corporate
law toward centralized management. 38' According to Armour and Skeel,
U.K. takeover regulation gives directors "a greater incentive to focus on
returns to shareholders. " 38 2 One could be led to suspect that U.K. employees
make fewer specific investments than others. 383 The mere threat of a hostile
takeover is said to have made British managers more likely to increase distri-
butions to shareholders. 38 4 However, on the flipside of the coin, the British
375. STEPHEN KENYON, SLADE, MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS IN TH4E U.S. AND U.K. 10.07 (2004).
376. DAVIES, supra note 94, 28-18.
377. Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, European Takeover Law-Towards a Modified Business
Judgment Rule for Takeover Law, 2 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 353, 377-79 (2000); Paul Davies & Klaus
Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 157, 173 (Reinier Kraakman et at.
eds., 2004).
378. Armour & Skeet, supra note 134, at 1737-38; see also Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile
Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial Agency Failure, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 164 (1996).
379. Armour et al., supra note 9, at 536; see also Deakin et al., supra note 359, at 163.
380. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 56, at 41-42; Simon Deakin, Richard Hobbs, David Nash &
Giles Slinger, Implicit Contracts. Takeovers and Corporate Governance: In the Shadow of the City Code, in IM-
PLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACTS 289, 292-95 (David Campbell, Hugh Collins & John Wightman
eds., 2003).
381. Davies & Hopt, supra note 377, at 173.
382. Armour & Skeet, supra note 134, at 1739.
383. See Deakin et al., supra note 380, at 329-30; see also Johnston, supra note 358, at 453-54.
384. Johnston, supra note 358, at 442.
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 5 0
system differs from the United States in important aspects of employee pro-
tection as well. While the United Kingdom does not score highly in the
OECD employment protection index385 and other leximetric studies of em-
ployment protection, 386 it is typically ranked between the United States and
Continental European countries. 387
A brief look at the law in the United Kingdom provides further evidence
for an intermediate classification. While the United Kingdom has never had
the employment-at-will doctrine, 38 8 labor legislation came to the country
later than Continental Europe, 389 finally arriving during the 1960s and
1970s under Labour and Conservative governments. 390 In addition to other
reforms, the Industrial Relations Act 1971 introduced the concept of "un-
fair dismissal" to the common law, requiring the employer to show a "fair
reason" for dismissal, which could include redundancy. 39 1 Tribunals quali-
fied dismissals as unfair in many cases, 392 including cases in which redun-
dancy was given as the reason for termination. 393 The Redundancy Payments
Act of 1965 introduced mandatory redundancy payments.3 94 Finally, follow-
ing an EU directive, 395 legislation was introduced in 1975396 under which
employers laying off twenty or more employees at one establishment within
a period of ninety days must consult employee representatives. 397
385. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD EMPLOYMENT OUT-
LOOK 117 (2004).
386. Botero et al., supra note 257, at 1362-63.
387. See Irene Lynch-Fannon, Employees as Corporate Stakeholders: Theory and Reality in a Transatlantic
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The policy behind most British employment legislation was to make the
labor market more flexible. Redundancy payments were intended to facili-
tate mobility and to overcome resistance against change, most importantly
among unions.398 Previously, dismissals had often been very costly to em-
ployers, as they were often met by spontaneous industrial action.39 9 Studies
showed that the reforms encouraged layoffs400 and reduced the number of
strikes over redundancy issues, 40 1 with employees even volunteering for re-
dundancies. 40 2 Firms introduced formal procedures to make dismissals ap-
pear more legitimate to employees and tribunals,403 reducing the number of
strikes and litigation risks.40 4
Although pro-stakeholder laws arrived in the United Kingdom much
later than in Germany, shareholder influence was pervasive before these laws
came into existence, often because of concentrated ownership or takeovers.
One interpretation is that that employment legislation brought U.K. corpo-
rate governance into balance. Armour, Deakin, and Konzelmann suggest
that job protection laws, redundancy payments, and consultation require-
ments giving "voice" to stakeholders, particularly in insolvency, play a role
in protecting their quasi-rents. 4 01 British unions were notoriously powerful
before the Thatcher government of the 1980s,40 6 and unions may have pro-
tected employee quasi-rents before these laws came into existence by or-
ganizing strikes and frequent industrial action. For most of the twentieth
century, British labor relations were characterized by what Otto Kahn-
Freund famously described as "collective laissez-faire," under which there
was little government interference in labor issues, such issues were instead
resolved through collective bargaining between employers and powerful un-
ions.40 7 By the time employment legislation was introduced, this "solution"
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to the holdup problem seems to have become very costly compared to U.S.
or Continental solutions, as interruptions of the production process are
counterproductive to the success of both the affected firm and to a corporate
governance system as a whole. The increase of employment protection was
accompanied by a drop in strikes. Employment law reduced resistance by
unions and ultimately aided in curbing their influence, which helped to
break up the petrification of the labor market. While explicit shareholder
influence exerted by controlling families was being replaced by implicit
shareholder influence through a strong threat of takeovers, the United King-
dom may have moved to a local optimum on the employment protection
scale by protecting employees against dismissal. Apparently, this allowed
ownership dispersion to deepen in the United Kingdom, or at least did not
impede it. 40 8 With the rise of the Thatcher government and the ensuing
attack on union power during the early 1980s, 40 9 the United Kingdom
seems to have completed the shift to a new equilibrium in which industrial
action had lost its significance: explicit shareholder influence had to some
extent given way to less intrusive implicit influence. Union power was
greatly reduced, but the British version of employment protection laws was
here to stay.
Unlike most other scholars, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi found empirically
that dispersed ownership had developed during the first decades of the
twentieth century, as early as in the United States, and deepened during the
later decades. 410 They argue that the introduction of takeover law-at the
behest of financial institutions and not the corporate sector-helped the
United Kingdom to solidify dispersed ownership, leading it further away
from Continental-style corporate governance. 41" Under this revised chronol-
ogy the analysis would have to be different, but still lend itself to a plausible
interpretation. According to the argument presented in this Article, com-
paratively weak shareholder influence (before the introduction of takeover
law during the 1960s) would have provided an ill fit to powerful unions.
However, the U.K. economy did not perform well from 1945 to 1980 rela-
tive to other OECD countries, whereas the Thatcher labor market reforms of
the early 1980s are often credited for the country's subsequent favorable
development. 4 12 The U.K. equilibrium may therefore only have been
reached after union power had been curbed.
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The United Kingdom qualifies as an intermediate case. 413 It has a higher
degree of shareholder influence than the United States, particularly because
of the Takeover Code, but a lower degree than the Continent. Employment
law is stronger than in the United States but weaker than in Continental
Europe.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have advanced the argument that increased shareholder
influence on managerial decision making exacerbates holdup problems re-
garding other constituencies, particularly employees. Ceteris paribus, pro-
stakeholder institutions are therefore more justified in terms of efficiency in
systems where shareholder influence is stronger than in others. Comparative
patterns in the law of large industrial countries seem to confirm this
hypothesis.
The core assumption is that the risk of not being rewarded later for firm-
specific investment in human capital will deter employees from making
such investment, resulting in productivity losses for firms. Since sharehold-
ers are the ex post beneficiaries of holdup, different levels of development of
pro-stakeholder laws are normatively desirable in different systems, depend-
ing on the degree to which managers are insulated from explicit and im-
plicit shareholder influence. A similar degree of safety from holdup may
require an entirely different degree of legal protection that needs to be
weighed against its cost. This Article discusses an important aspect influ-
encing the firm's relationship to labor in that respect, namely the effects of
shareholder influence on managers. Shareholder influence can either be ex-
erted directly, as in the case of ownership concentration in Continental Eu-
rope, or through a set of arrangements that forces managers to pursue
shareholder value maximization, as in the United Kingdom. U.S. corporate
governance is unique in that it largely excludes shareholder influence, grants
unusually broad latitude of action to managers, and shields them from share-
holder influence more than in European systems on either side of the En-
glish Channel.
Given the typically strong influence of large shareholders on managerial
decision making, employment protection and other pro-stakeholder laws
are, ceteris paribus, more justified in terms of efficiency in systems with con-
centrated ownership. This is not necessarily so in systems with dispersed
ownership, given the relative freedom managers enjoy. Thus, the theory pro-
vides a new explanation for the way pro-labor institutions, such as
codetermination and employment protection, tend to be relatively stronger
in Continental Europe than in the United States. However, there are also
413. Cf Lynch-Fannon, supra note 387, at 171-72 ("[T]o speak of an Anglo-American model of
governance is incorrect.").
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important differences between the two major systems (the United States and
the United Kingdom) characterized by dispersed ownership. Takeover law
and other aspects of corporate governance commit managers to maximize ex
post shareholder wealth more strongly in the United Kingdom than in the
United States. The United Kingdom seems to be in the middle between the
United States and Continental Europe both with respect to shareholder in-
fluence on managerial decision making and with respect to pro-labor laws,
thus confirming the general theory. All of these systems may be in, or close
to, two very different local optima.
Different equilibria have different advantages and disadvantages. Tightly-
knit regulation may increase the costs of adapting to changed circumstances,
as it makes it harder to dismiss employees in situations where it is desirable
or even imperative for the maximization of total social welfare. The U.S.
system is probably more flexible, as managers with broad discretion may
more easily respond to changed external circumstances than is the case with
one-size-fits-all regulatory solutions. However, the U.S. system has other
drawbacks. Although shareholder protection against managerial misconduct
must be distinguished from shareholder influence (the crucial factor for
holdup risk), there are certain links between the two. Most of all, managerial
insulation may be the cause of the system's instability and the recurrence of
large scandals. 4 4 The absence of shareholder influence implies that share-
holder-stakeholder conflicts are relatively insignificant, while both providers
of capital and labor are equally exposed to rent-seeking by managers. The
U.S. preoccupation with principal-agent problems could therefore be ex-
plained as viewing managerial rent-seeking as a shared threat that (unlike in
Continental Europe) turns both constituencies into natural allies. 41 5
The other lesson we should keep in mind is that institutional comple-
mentarities need to be taken seriously. Legal reforms aiming at increased
shareholder influence in the United States should be met with caution, as
should reforms of pro-stakeholder laws in Europe. The intention is not to
claim that the law of each of the corporate governance systems discussed is
perfect under the given circumstances. However, reforming only one of the
two sides of the coin may turn out to be detrimental. One-size-fits-all solu-
tions may be a bad fit in corporate governance systems different from the
systems in which those solutions originated.
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